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STUDENT-LOAN DISCHARGE—AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
THE UNDUE HARSHIP PROVISION OF § 523(A)(8) UNDER 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
ABSTRACT 
Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, student-loan debtors could 
receive an automatic discharge of their debts in bankruptcy. Now, they cannot. 
Since the Code’s enactment, Congress has pursued progressively harsher 
standards, continually narrowing the scope of when a student-loan debtor 
could obtain discharge. Following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act in 2005, student-loan debtors now 
encounter the toughest obstacles to discharge they have ever faced. By 
extending the protection of the discharge exception of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) to 
private lenders, Congress effectively placed all students who take out loans to 
pay for their education at the mercy of a harsh system whose narrow 
exceptions for discharge force debtors to prove that they face a “certainty of 
hopelessness” in their future. 
The harshness of this system is well documented by empirical studies 
analyzing the results of bankruptcy courts applying the undue hardship 
provision in § 523(a)(8). These studies paint a portrait of inconsistency and 
subjectivity across the many judicial districts. Attempted application of the 
undefined term “undue hardship” has resulted in multiple judicially-created 
tests, the most predominant of which is the Brunner test, requiring a finding of 
non-dischargeability if the debtor fails any of the test’s three prongs. 
This Comment presents findings from an empirical study of ten years of 
bankruptcy appellate decisions dealing with the undue hardship provision, an 
area yet unexplored. Its findings reveal an enormous inequity in the treatment 
of debtors and creditors in these cases. These findings suggest a 
reconsideration of the current approach of the bankruptcy system toward 
student-loan debt and whether the judicially-created tests have narrowed this 
exception beyond what the Code intended. Furthermore, it recommends careful 
assessment for practitioners considering an appeal on behalf of a debtor of an 
unfavorable bankruptcy court decision. 
 
FREEMAN GALLEYSPROOFS 2/25/2014 9:16 AM 
148 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 30 
INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Edison once said of his electric light, “None of my inventions has 
cost me as much time, labor and study.”1 When Edison developed his light 
bulb, the idea of electric light was nothing new. In fact, the idea had become 
prevalent in scientific communities more than seventy-five years prior to 
Edison’s invention.2 The effects of electricity had been studied for years, but as 
the new age of science was ushered into being,3 Edison found purpose and 
commercial application in the harnessing of electric light through a long-
lasting filament.4 He looked behind the veil of data and previous experiments 
and discovered a way to make light a practical option for millions across 
America. Speaking about his methods, Edison stated: 
It has been said of me that my methods are empirical. That is 
true . . . . So, when I am after a chemical result that I have in mind I 
may make hundreds or thousands of experiments out of which there 
may be one that promises results in the right direction. This I follow 
up to its legitimate conclusion, discarding the others, and usually get 
what I am after. There is no doubt about this being empirical; but 
when it comes to problems of a mechanical nature, I want to tell you 
that all I’ve ever tacked and solved have been by hard, logical 
thinking.5 
This response showed the time and effort it took Edison to really understand 
and apply his knowledge to craft an invention that would revolutionize the 
world. 
The herculean effort Edison applied to the light bulb is not so different 
from what is required to fully understand the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) and 
its application by courts. Indeed, Edison’s methods of empirical investigation 
and hard, logical thinking should be applied to study and decipher the effects 
of the Code’s application. Much like electric light, many of the effects of the 
Code’s application have already been studied and reported. Specifically, 
researchers and authors have produced significant data and results as it relates 
 
 1 THE QUOTABLE EDISON 27 (Michele Wehrwein Albion ed., 2011). 
 2 See Martin V. Melosi, THOMAS A. EDISON AND THE MODERNIZATION OF AMERICA 65–66 (Mark C. 
Carnes ed., 2008). The first public demonstration of electric light was made in 1808 when Sir Humphrey Davy 
unveiled his arc lighting invention, which had little commercial application until the late 1870s. See id. at 65. 
Furthermore, Davy produced incandescence in 1802, but hundreds of experiments following this finding failed 
to produce the type of lasting filament that Edison achieved. See id. at 66. 
 3 See id. at 65–66. 
 4 See id. at 70. 
 5 THE QUOTABLE EDISON, supra note 1, at 10 . 
FREEMAN GALLEYSPROOFS 2/25/2014 9:16 AM 
2013] STUDENT-LOAN DISCHARGE 149 
to how bankruptcy courts have applied the “undue hardship” provision from 
§ 523(a)(8)’s exception to discharge.6 The challenge moving forward is to find, 
much like Edison, a way to use and expand on that data to provide practitioners 
and judges guidance and information that adds value to their decision-making 
processes in this area of the law. This Comment, through an empirical study of 
ten years of appellate decisions governing undue hardship determinations, 
seeks to pull back the veil and provide an analysis of those courts whose 
precedents have set the tone for student-loan discharge. 
A look at recent news articles from around the United States reveals a 
predominantly negative perspective on the financial outlook of a student-loan 
debtor.7 Noting that student-loan debt has surpassed the $1 trillion mark, one 
writer for the Chicago Sun-Times speculated that “student loans are about to 
become a larger financial crisis than the mortgage disaster.”8 However, this 
“sky is falling” perspective on student loans is nothing new. Since the Code’s 
enactment in 1978, debtors have faced ever-tightening standards making 
student loans harder to discharge. Prior to the Code’s enactment, student-loan 
debt could be discharged automatically like many other loans in the bankruptcy 
context.9 The Code imposed a new conditional discharge standard10 upon 
student-loan debt, theoretically targeting rampant abuse of the bankruptcy 
system. Legislators conjured images of college graduates freshly emerging 
from their universities with advanced degrees in hand and bright futures who 
might then seek to discharge their significant debt before accepting a high-
 
 6 See Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the Undue Hardship 
Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012); Rafael I. Pardo, Illness and Inability to Repay: The Role of Debtor 
Health in the Discharge of Educational Debt, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505 (2008); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle 
R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179 
(2009) [hereinafter The Real Student-Loan Scandal]; Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in 
the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 
405 (2005) [hereinafter Undue Hardship]. 
 7 See, e.g., Peter Coy, Student Loans: Debt for Life, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 18, 2012), 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-09-06/student-loans-debt-for-life#p1; Ron Lieber, Last Plea on 
School Loans: Proving a Hopeless Future, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/01/ 
business/shedding-student-loans-in-bankruptcy-is-an-uphill-battle.html?pagewanted=all; Steve Rhode, 
American Households Sinking in Student Loan Debt Says Pew Research Center, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steve-rhode/american-households-sinki_b_1933143.html. 
 8 Terry Savage, Terry Savage: Federal Student Loans Next Big Crisis, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, (Oct. 13, 
2012), http://www.suntimes.com/business/savage/15755472-452/terry-savage-federal-student-loans-next-big-
crisis.html. 
 9 Brendan Baker, Deeper Debt, Denial of Discharge: The Harsh Treatment of Student Loan Debt in 
Bankruptcy, Recent Developments, and Proposed Reforms, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1213, 1214 (2012). 
 10 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012) (requiring the debtor prove that the student-loan debt would impose 
an undue hardship on the debtor if not discharged). 
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paying job.11 Even in the face of a study proving the contrary, Congress 
enacted the new provision and has never looked back.12 
An unfair debtor stereotype based on assumptions directly contradicted by 
empirical evidence13 was only the beginning of the difficulty faced by student-
loan debtors under the new undue hardship standard.14 The Code does not 
define “undue hardship,”15 and the task has now fallen to the bankruptcy courts 
to determine how to apply this standard. In response, bankruptcy courts 
developed two predominant tests to assess whether a debtor’s student-loan debt 
imposed an undue hardship: the totality of circumstances test and the three-
factor Brunner test.16 Both tests analyze the same core considerations,17 and 
likewise, both suffer from the same maladies—inconsistency and subjectivity. 
The result is that these tests, which lean heavily on the court’s ability to predict 
the future as to the debtor’s potential future income or wage earning ability,18 
have created a system with an unsettling amount of judicial discretion and 
subjectivity.19 
Despite the broad-sweeping negative public outlook on student-loan debt, 
the prejudicial stereotype faced by student-loan debtors, and the inconsistency 
 
 11 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 536–38 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6425 (insisting 
that the average student debtor is trying to take advantage of a loophole in the system). Professors Rafael 
Pardo and Michelle Lacey, in a 2005 study, addressed this abusive student-loan debtor stereotype thoroughly 
and concluded that the justification of the change was built on bombastic and factually incorrect assertions. See 
Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 419–32. 
 12 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 133. 
 13 Id. 
 14 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 15 Section 523(a)(8) states that educational debt is excepted from discharge unless it “would impose an 
undue hardship,” but the following subparagraphs and § 101 do not define what qualifies as an undue hardship. 
See Id. §§ 101, 523(a)(8) (omitting any elaboration on what undue hardship means). 
 16 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2nd Cir. 1987) (per curiam) 
(creating the Brunner test); Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 
704 (8th Cir. 1981) (creating the totality of the circumstances test). 
 17 See Cheney v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Cheney), 280 B.R. 648, 659 (N.D. Iowa 2002). 
 18 The fact that this inquiry has been problematic is buttressed by an expansive 2005 study that looked at 
numerous cases to try to find factual differences that underlay judicial determinations. See Undue Hardship, 
supra note 6, at 503. The results of this study suggest that there is a great amount of inconsistency in judicial 
determinations when applying different facts to these vague standards. See id. (finding few statistically 
significant differences between debtors found to have a future ability to repay and those with a future inability 
to repay). 
 19 Professor Douglass Boshkoff stated in his article that “experience with the conditional discharge of 
educational debts in our country suggests that the bankruptcy judge will be given almost unlimited power to 
determine the lifestyle of a debtor who seeks a discharge.” Douglass G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional and 
Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 125 (1982). 
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produced by judicially created tests, a 2009 study of 115 bankruptcy filings in 
the Western District of Washington indicated that 57% of those who filed 
adversary proceedings seeking discharge of their student loans were able to get 
some or all of their loans discharged.20 So, why does the negativity associated 
with attempting to discharge student loans persist? The same study further 
concluded that, even in light of the data showing that more than half of the 
debtors studied received discharge of at least some of their student-loan debt, 
the Code’s undue hardship discharge provision has failed to optimize the 
financial health of debtors in distress.21 Furthermore, because the study found 
that courts relied more heavily on extralegal factors than legal factors to make 
relief determinations, it also asserted that the discharge determination process 
exhibited “hallmarks of a system that has run amok.”22 Thus, even with some 
measureable degree of success for student-loan debtors in dire need of 
financial relief, the bankruptcy system remains plagued by an inconsistent 
message from the bankruptcy courts and, ultimately, Congress—anyone can 
receive educational loans, but it takes a very special person to discharge them. 
This Comment will build on research that has documented the symptomatic 
problems that bankruptcy courts have had in applying the Code’s undue 
hardship provision. Ultimately, this Comment aims to provide practitioners 
with new information about the approach appellate courts have taken when 
considering lower court determinations of undue hardship. To accomplish this 
goal, this Comment will present findings from an empirical analysis of ten 
years of bankruptcy appellate opinions spanning from January 1, 2002, to 
December 31, 2011. 
This Comment is organized into four parts. Part I explains the background 
and development of law surrounding the application of the undue hardship 
 
 20 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 184. 
 21 Id. at 235. 
 22 Id. This article also postulated that the “higher education finance system suffers from schizophrenia—
namely, a public-oriented approach to student-loan origination but a business-oriented approach to student-
loan collection.” Id. This view echoes the concerns voiced at the time of the Code’s enactment: 
[I]f [student] loans are granted too freely and that is what is causing the increase in bankruptcies, 
then the problem is a general problem, not a bankruptcy problem. The loan program should be 
tightened, or collection efforts should be increased. If neither of those alternatives is acceptable, 
then the loan programs should be viewed as general social legislation that has an associated cost. 
It is inappropriate to view the program as social legislation when granting the loans, but strictly 
as business when attempting to collect. Such inconsistency does not square with general 
bankruptcy policy. 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 134 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6095. 
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provision. Part I.A discusses discharge in bankruptcy proceedings generally, 
the undue hardship discharge provision and the legislative history prior to its 
enactment, and the rapid expansion of the exception to discharge. Part I.B 
examines the two judicially-created tests that courts use to determine whether a 
debtor has met his or her undue hardship burden and the problems these tests 
present. Part I.C analyzes the procedural requirements of the undue hardship 
provision and how they comport with the Code’s overarching principles 
concerning the scope of a debtor’s opportunity for a fresh start. 
Part II addresses the bankruptcy appellate system as a whole. Part II.A 
outlines the function of this Comment’s study. Part II.B provides an overview 
of the unique structure of the bankruptcy appellate system. Part II.C delineates 
the appellate process. Finally, Part II.D discusses the reasons why parties seek 
to appeal determinations of undue hardship. 
Part III then presents the empirical study of bankruptcy appellate opinions. 
Part III.A discusses the methodology by which opinions were selected for 
analysis, while Part III.B presents the findings of this study and its conclusions. 
Finally, this Comment concludes in Part IV with reflections on the results of 
the study and how these results relate to the principles of bankruptcy. More 
specifically, this Comment will discuss the study’s implications for 
practitioners as they make choices about how to effectively maneuver through 
the bankruptcy appellate system and for judges as they consider undue 
hardship determination on appeal. 
I. THE UNDUE HARDSHIP DISCHARGE PROVISION—A LOOK AT ITS HISTORY, 
APPLICATION, AND DIFFICULTIES AT THE BANKRUPTCY COURT LEVEL 
This Part begins with a discussion of the underlying policies of bankruptcy 
effectuated by the discharge of debt and describes the history behind the undue 
hardship provision’s enactment and subsequent legislation. Part I.B will 
discuss the application of the two judicially-created tests to determine whether 
a debtor has proven undue hardship and provide a critique of their results. 
Finally, Part I.C concludes with a critique of the procedural difficulties 
presented by the undue hardship discharge provision. 
A. The Development and Progression of § 523(a)(8)’s Undue Hardship 
Provision 
The bankruptcy system has two foundational principles that guide the 
interpretations of the Code’s law and policy: (1) a fresh start for the debtor (the 
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“fresh start principle”) and (2) equal treatment of similarly situated creditors 
(the “equality principle”).23 The fresh start principle is based on “the notion 
that substantive relief should be afforded in the form of forgiveness of existing 
debt, with relinquishment by the debtor of . . . existing nonexempt assets.”24 
The equality principle provides a basis for the procedural processes of the 
Code that seek to maximize collection efforts of creditors when the debtor has 
insufficient assets to repay.25 
Within the context of chapter 7, debt discharge is generally automatic.26 
After a debtor has filed a petition for bankruptcy, a creditor must file a proof of 
claim to receive any compensation that might result from the liquidation of the 
debtor’s assets.27 Once the creditor’s allowable claim is calculated28 and the 
distribution of the debtor’s assets is completed,29 the debtor’s remaining debt is 
automatically discharged,30 relieving the debtor of personal liability for his or 
her outstanding debts.31 The automatic discharge is subject to certain 
exceptions32 where Congress deemed the interest in full recovery of debt to 
outweigh the debtor’s interest in a fresh start.33 
 
 23 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5793; H.R. REP. NO. 95-
595, at 177–78. 
 24 Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 414–15; see Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) 
(stating that the fresh start policy of bankruptcy law gives a debtor who surrenders property for distribution to 
creditors freedom from pre-existing debt). 
 25 See Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 415 (noting that the bankruptcy system solves the “common 
pool problem” that can arise if creditors only pursue their own interests at the cost of other creditors) (citing 
Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 7–19 (1986) (giving a comprehensive 
analysis of the role of bankruptcy law as a “collective debt-collection device”)). 
 26 See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2012) (“The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless . . . .”) (emphasis 
added). 
 27 See id. § 501(a). But, note that creditors do not file proof of claims in no-asset chapter 7 cases. 
 28 See id. §§ 502, 506. 
 29 See id. §§ 725–26. 
 30 See id. § 727(a) (“The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 31 See id. § 727(b) (“[T]his section discharges the debtor from . . . any liability on a claim.”). 
 32 See id. §§ 523, 727. 
 33 See Patel v. Shamrock Floorcovering Servs., Inc. (In re Patel), 565 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that the statutory exceptions to discharge recognize Congressional intent to protect certain creditors 
from harm); Miller v. Lewis, 391 B.R. 380, 384 (E.D. Tex. 2008) (stating that certain debts, for public policy 
reasons, have been decided by Congress to override policies favoring a fresh start); Bolen v. Sallie Mae 
Servicing Corp. (In re Bolen), 287 B.R. 127, 129 (D. Vt. 2002) (noting that there are certain circumstances 
where giving the debtor a fresh start is not the paramount concern and that protection of the creditor is more 
important). 
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Unlike other discharge exceptions, Congress deemed that the student-loan 
debt discharge exception needed additional protection from discharge.34 
Curiously, the student-loan debt exception is not particularly straightforward. 
Rather, student-loan debt is unique because its exception from dischargeability 
creates a very specific test or condition upon which it can be discharged.35 This 
has not always been the case. Prior to the Code’s enactment, student-loan debt 
was automatically dischargeable.36 However, fear of abuse by student-loan 
debtors led to the addition of the undue hardship test to determine whether a 
debtor could obtain relief.37 At its inception, then, § 523(a)(8)’s undue 
hardship provision was unduly slanted against the student-loan debtor. 
Analyzing this supposed slant, Rafael Pardo, a prominent bankruptcy law 
professor, and Michelle Lacey, an accomplished mathematics professor, 
performed an empirical study to examine this supposed rampant abuse and the 
effects of applying the undue hardship provision.38 Their study found an 
unearned, negative stereotype of the student-loan debtor presented in the 
legislative history of the enactment of the Code.39 Furthermore, their study 
 
 34 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 35 See id. (creating the condition of “undue hardship” to be able to discharge student-loan debt). 
 36 See id. § 35(a) (1976) (omitting educational debt from the list of debts unaffected by discharge) 
(repealed 1978). 
 37 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 536–38 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6425. 
 38 Undue Hardship, supra note 6. 
 39 Id. at 419–28. Arguing against the enactment of the undue hardship provision, Representative James 
O’Hara stated that the provision was “a discriminatory remedy for a ‘scandal’ which exists primarily in the 
imagination.” See H.R. REP NO. 94-1232 (1976), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 148, and in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6109. Representative O’Hara decried the provision for likening the Code’s treatment of 
student-loan debtors to those who obtain loans by “fraud, felony, and alimony-dodging.” Id. (asserting that the 
new provision subjects educational loans to an assumption of criminality). Further substantiating 
Representative O’Hara’s claims, a GAO study performed before the provision officially became law 
“indicated that less than one percent of all federally insured and guaranteed educational loans were discharged 
in bankruptcy.” Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 423; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 133. 
In the face of such convincing evidence, Representative Allen E. Ertel opposed the removal of the 
undue hardship provision by resorting to unsubstantiated and unrealistic characterizations of student-loan 
debtors as bad faith actors who would inevitably abuse the bankruptcy system. See Undue Hardship, supra 
note 6, at 424; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 536–38. Representative Ertel insisted that, without the undue hardship 
provision, the law would “encourage fraud,” and, furthermore, student-loan debtors would simply take 
advantage of a free education, immediately discharge their debts upon graduation, and begin their promising 
careers with a “clean slate” and the “excellent credit rating that accompanies a bankruptcy.” See H.R. Rep. No. 
95-595, at 536–38. Contra Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 424 (disputing Representative Ertels’s assertion 
that bankruptcy results in excellent credit ratings). Siding ultimately with Representative Ertel, Congress 
enacted the provision, which therefore, at its inception, vilified the student-loan debtor. Sadly, courts have 
embraced this lopsided stereotype when applying the law. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mersmann (In re 
Mersmann), 505 F.3d 1033, 1042 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Limitations on the discharge ability [sic] of student loans 
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concluded that the landscape of student-loan debtors is not so inundated with 
abusers of the bankruptcy system, as Congress had feared upon enactment of 
the Code.40 
However, since its inception, the Code’s student-loan exception has 
progressively become more protective of student-loan lenders and harsher in 
its treatment of student-loan debtors. In its initial iteration, the exception 
provided the option of discharge both under the undue hardship test and when 
a debt “first became due before five years before the date of the filing of the 
petition.”41 In 1990, Congress extended the five-year exception to seven 
years.42 In 1998, Congress eliminated the seven-year exception altogether43 
and left student-loan debtors with only the undue hardship test for relief. Most 
recently, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 (“BAPCPA”) expanded the coverage of § 523(a)(8)’s protection to 
private, for-profit lenders.44 The BAPCPA amendment further reflects 
Congress’s pro-lender stance and represents the latest step in the progression of 
§ 523(a)(8) and its attempt to curtail the bankruptcy relief available to student-
loan debtors.45 
 
serve [to] ‘prevent[] abuses of the educational loan system by restricting the ability to discharge a student loan 
shortly after a student’s graduation . . . .’”); Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 427 n.112. 
 40 Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 459. 
 41 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (1978) (formerly 
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) (1988)). 
 42 See Robert C. Cloud, When Does Repaying a Student Loan Become an Undue Hardship?, 185 EDUC. 
L. REP. 783, 786 n.20 (2004). 
 43 See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971(a), 112 Stat. 1581 (1998). 
Interestingly, this amendment came in the wake of a 1997 report by the National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission recommending that Congress eliminate § 523(a)(8) altogether. See NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW 
COMM’N, FINAL REPORT, § 1.4.5 (October 20, 1997). The report went on to say that student loans should be 
“treated like all other unsecured debts. In so doing, the dischargeability provisions would be consistent with 
federal policy to encourage educational endeavors. . . . Litigation over ‘undue hardship’ would be eliminated, 
so that the discharge of student loans no longer would be denied to those who need it most.” Id. 
 44 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 220, 
119 Stat. 23, 59 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (2012)). 
 45 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 180–82 (expounding on the impact of the 2005 
amendments, the unregulated nature of private student loans, and the creditor-friendly policies of Congress). 
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B. The Judicially Created Tests to Assess a Debtor’s Claim of Undue 
Hardship 
The application of the undue hardship provision in bankruptcy courts has 
been plagued with inconsistency,46 which has primarily resulted from 
significant judicial subjectivity in undue hardship determinations.47 Congress 
failed to define what undue hardship meant when § 523(a)(8) was created,48 
and in the wake of its vague wording, courts created two principal tests to 
assess a debtor’s claim of undue hardship: (1) the Brunner test49 and (2) the 
totality of the circumstances test.50 The Brunner test is the predominant test 
used by most circuits, but this section will address both tests in turn and 
critique their shortcomings in litigation at the bankruptcy court level. 
1. The Brunner Test 
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Brunner v. New York State Higher 
Education Services Corp. has become the principal standard for judging 
whether a debtor has shown that he or she will suffer undue hardship without 
the discharge of his or her student-loan debt.51 The Brunner test requires: 
 
 
 46 Despite Congress’ repeated re-drafting of § 523(a)(8), incrementally limiting the ability to discharge 
student-loan debt, they never attempted to define the core provision of exception—undue hardship. See 11 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 523(a)(8) (omitting any elaboration on what undue hardship means); supra Part I.A. 
 47 See Undue Hardship, supra note 6, at 503 (faulting judicial discretion for the haphazard results in 
undue hardship litigation and for compromising the fresh start principle). Subjectivity here refers to the overall 
application of the undue hardship provision across all districts. Although courts find themselves simply limited 
by precedents today, the precedents differ from district to district and are the result of an initial judge’s 
determination that they would allow or disallow some expense when determining dischargeability. Because the 
precedents differ, the overall result is indicative of the initial subjective determinations. 
 48 Section 523(a)(8) states that educational debt is excepted from discharge unless it “would impose an 
undue hardship,” but the following subparagraphs and § 101 of the Code do not define what qualifies as an 
undue hardship. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 523(a)(8) (omitting any elaboration on what undue hardship means). 
 49 See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2nd Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
 50 See Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 
1981). 
 51 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. The court in Brunner, recognizing that there was little appellate guidance 
concerning the undue hardship provision, took the opportunity to weigh in and formally adopt the test spelled 
out in the District Court from which this appeal originated. Id. Quickly analyzing each of the three prongs in 
turn, the court noted that prongs one and three comported with common sense and the legislative intent behind 
§ 523(a)(8). Id. Though it recognized the second prong was “problematic,” the court ultimately held that 
requiring evidence that a hardship would continue into the future “more reliably guarantees that the hardship 
presented is ‘undue.’” Id. 
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(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and 
expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and her 
dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional 
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to 
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student 
loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the 
loans.52 
A debtor must establish that he or she meets the standard of each prong to 
satisfy the undue hardship provision.53 
Judicial application of the three prongs of the Brunner test has generated 
many difficulties for student-loan debtors. To prevail under the first prong—
the current inability to repay—a debtor must establish that, based on his or her 
current income and expenses, repayment of the student-loan debt would force 
the debtor to fall beneath a “minimal standard of living.”54 Courts have 
interpreted this first prong to call for an analysis of the debtor’s income and 
expenses, finding that when expenses exceed income, “the debtor will have 
established an inability to maintain a standard of living in absence of an undue 
hardship discharge.”55 However, analyzing income and expenses to determine 
what constitutes a minimal standard of living and whether the debtor may fall 
beneath it is a fact-intensive inquiry that allows for considerable amounts of 
judicial subjectivity because of an ambiguous standard and differing 
interpretations of what constitutes “minimal living.”56 Thus, what should be a 
 
 52 Id. 
 53 See id. (requiring each prong be met in order to afford relief); Pobiner v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In 
re Pobiner), 309 B.R. 405 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2004); Williams v. EFG Tech/Rutgers (In re Williams), 296 B.R. 
128 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2003); Shankwiler v. Nat’l Student Loan Mktg. (In re Shankwiler), 208 B.R. 701 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1997). It also bears noting that once the debtor establishes that he or she would suffer undue 
hardship, courts have differed in their approach as to whether this entitles the debtor to the full discharge of his 
or her debt or a partial discharge that brings the student-loan debt level down to a judicially determined 
manageable level. See Amanda M. Foster, All or Nothing: Partial Discharge of Student Loans Is Not the 
Answer to Perceived Unfairness of the Undue Hardship Exception, 16 WIDENER L.J. 1053, 1072–83 (2007) 
The circuit courts are split over this issue, and scholars on both sides of the argument have advocated strongly 
for congressional clarification. See Frank T. Bayuk, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship Exception, 31 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 1091, 1116 (2004) (arguing that partial discharge better comports with ideals of economic and 
fundamental fairness for both the creditor and debtor); Foster, supra, at 1073 (arguing that the Code, based on 
plain meaning and statutory construction, legislative history, and principles of fairness, requires a strict, all-or-
nothing approach, awarding the debtor full discharge if he or she meets the undue hardship standard). 
 54 See generally Brunner, 831 F.2d 395. 
 55 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 196–97 n.76. 
 56 See Hart v. ECMC (In re Hart), 438 B.R. 406, 410 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (requiring the debtor to show he 
is currently minimizing his expenses); Innes v. Kansas (In re Innes), 284 B.R. 496, 509 (D. Kan. 2002) 
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straightforward test to determine if expenses exceed income may morph into 
an opportunity for a judge to mandate what kind of cable TV or wireless phone 
plan the debtor should have.57 
Should the debtor establish his or her current inability to repay, he or she 
must then demonstrate that the less than minimal standard of living will persist 
if the student-loan debt is not discharged.58 Put more simply, the debtor’s 
current inability to repay is not enough; it must be clear that the debtor will be 
unable to repay in the future.59 Bankruptcy courts have found this prong to be 
the most important, insisting that a debtor “must show that circumstances 
indicate a certainty of hopelessness, not merely a present inability to fulfill 
financial commitment.”60 Courts have attempted to analyze the debtor’s future 
inability to repay upon certain objective factors,61 but even these factors allow 
 
(determining that when a debtor’s expenses exceed their income they cannot maintain a minimal standard of 
living and repay their loan); Pincus v. Graduate Loan Ctr. (In re Pincus), 280 B.R. 303, 317 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (holding that a debtor is not required to live below the poverty line but must show that repayment will 
require more than a restricted budget); The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 196–97 n.76 
(highlighting the Ninth Circuit’s approach requiring that the debtor fall somewhere between “‘temporary 
financial adversity’ and ‘utter hopelessness’” to satisfy the first prong). It is in applying the facts of a debtor’s 
expenses to these vague standards that a judge is able to impose a significant amount of subjectivity. See 
Pincus, 280 B.R. at 317 (finding a debtor’s expenses excessive in the areas of “(1) communication, (2) cable, 
(3) food, (4) clothing, (5) laundry and dry-cleaning, (6) transportation, (7) recreation, and (8) certain medical 
expenses” and further suggesting the debtor could have used more inexpensive cell phone contract plans, eaten 
out less, and washed his own clothes). 
 57 See Pincus, 280 B.R. at 317. 
 58 See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396. 
 59 See id.; Sanborn v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Sanborn), 431 B.R. 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) 
(holding that the debtor must show that their condition of undue hardship will continue into the future). 
 60 Wallace v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Wallace), 443 B.R. 781, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2010) 
(quoting Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
 61 See id. (asserting that the court may consider such circumstances as illness, disability, a lack of useable 
job skills, or the existence of a large number of dependents); Barrett, 487 F.3d at 359 (holding that the 
overarching principle that should determine whether the debtor satisfies this prong must be that the additional 
circumstances be “beyond the debtor’s control, not borne of free choice”). The Ninth Circuit has attempted to 
identify a list of factors that might be useful in determining whether the debtor will have a future inability to 
pay. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nys (In re Nys), 446 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2006). These factors, otherwise 
known as the Nys factors, include: 
(1) Serious mental or physical disability of the debtor or the debtor’s dependents which prevents 
employment or advancement; (2) The debtor’s obligations to care for dependents; (3) Lack of, or 
severely limited education; (4) Poor quality of education; (5) Lack of usable or marketable job 
skills; (6) Underemployment; (7) Maximized income potential in the chosen educational field, 
and no other more lucrative job skills; (8) Limited number of years remaining in [the debtor’s] 
work life to allow payment of the loan; (9) Age or other factors that prevent retraining or 
relocation as a means for payment of the loan; (10) Lack of assets, whether or not exempt, which 
could be used to pay the loan; (11) Potentially increasing expenses that outweigh any potential 
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for significant judicial interpretation and speculation.62 However, speculation 
on the judge’s part is inherent in an inquiry that essentially asks the judge to 
predict the future.63 This prong is extremely problematic because it is unclear 
exactly how a student-loan debtor can prove that his or her situation falls into 
the area envisioned by the Brunner test as sufficiently hopeless to warrant a 
grant of discharge. Evidence from a 2007 study suggests a debtor’s health 
status is likely to have the most statistically significant association with 
discharge determination in a student-loan debtor’s case.64 Ultimately, though, 
this crystal-ball-gazing exercise performed by courts is fraught with 
subjectivity and guesswork. 
Finally, debtors must establish that they have made a good faith effort to 
repay their loans, which the court assesses by looking at the debtor’s 
prepetition conduct.65 Courts have recognized that good faith is “both an 
intangible and subjective standard,”66 which has resulted in even more 
inconsistent application of the Brunner test.67 Factors vary from circuit to 
circuit, but most circuits analyze some form of the following four factors to 
determine whether a debtor has made a good faith effort to repay: 
(1) whether the debtor attempts to repay the debt; (2) the length of 
time after the student loan becomes due that the debtor seeks to 
discharge the debt; (3) the percentage of the student loan debt in 
 
appreciation in the value of the debtor’s assets and/or likely increases in the debtor’s income; 
(12) Lack of better financial options elsewhere. 
Id. 
 62 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 196–97 n.76 (finding, in a study of cases in the 
Ninth Circuit, reliance on extralegal factors, such as what judge decided the case, to be more significant in the 
outcome of whether a debtor satisfied the second prong of Brunner). 
 63 Roundtree-Crawley v. Educ Credit Mgmt. Corp., (In re Crawley), 460 B.R. 421, 439 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2011) (noting that the inquiry is forward-looking in nature); Berry v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Berry), 
266 B.R. 359, 364 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) (recognizing that any analysis under the second prong of Brunner 
is, by its very nature, speculative). 
 64 See Pardo, supra note 6, at 510–12 (finding in a study of a decade of bankruptcy decisions that the 
debtor’s health played the largest role, even eclipsing a debtor’s monthly household income and expenses, in a 
bankruptcy court’s determination of undue hardship). 
 65 Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 (finding that the debtor did not act in good faith by filing for discharge only 
within a month from when the first payment was due and by failing to take less drastic remedies before filing 
for discharge). 
 66 E.g., Grine v. Tex. Guar. Student Loan Corp. (In re Grine), 254 B.R. 191, 193 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2000). 
 67 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 200 & n.98 (2009) (noting the “inherent 
subjectivity in an amorphous standard such as good faith”). 
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relation to the debtor’s total indebtedness; (4) the debtor’s attempts to 
find suitable employment.68 
Basically, a court must determine whether a debtor has tried to find work, 
maximize income, and minimize expenses.69 Holding consistent with the other 
prongs in the Brunner test, this prong opens the door to a fact intensive inquiry 
by judges, who have historically applied the standard from a “less forgiving 
stance.”70 All in all, the Brunner test reflects the general attitude of the Code’s 
progressively harsher stance toward student-loan debtors, resulting in a test 
that is extremely technical and leaves very little room for a debtor to succeed.71 
2. The Totality of the Circumstances Test 
Offering an alternative to the Brunner test, the Eighth Circuit has officially 
adopted the totality of the circumstances test.72 Analysis under this test 
requires the court to consider: “(1) the debtor’s past, present, and reasonably 
reliable future financial resources; (2) a calculation of the debtor’s and her 
dependent’s reasonable necessary living expenses; and (3) any other relevant 
facts and circumstances surrounding each particular bankruptcy case.”73 
 
 68 Green v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Green), 238 B.R. 727, 736 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999) 
(citations omitted); see Hart v. ECMC (In re Hart), 438 B.R. 406, 413 (E.D. Mich. 2010); Dep’t of Educ. v. 
Wallace (In re Wallace), 259 B.R. 170, 185 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citations omitted). 
 69 Afflitto v. United States (In re Afflitto), 273 B.R. 162, 171–72 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001) (citing 
Goulet v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp. (In re Goulet), 264 B.R. 527, 531 (W.D. Wis. 2001)) (finding that not making 
repayments does not preclude a finding of good faith if the debtor has sought to maximize income potential 
and minimize expenses); see also Downey v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (In re Downey), 255 B.R. 72, 77 (Bankr. N.D. 
Fla. 2000) (deciding good faith was not established because debtor failed to show she minimized her 
expenses). 
 70 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 200; see Katheryn E. Hancock, A Certainty of 
Hopelessness: Debt, Depression, and the Discharge of Student Loans under the Bankruptcy Code, 33 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 151, 156 (2009) (arguing that application of the good faith prong is unduly harsh based upon 
the strict approach originally taken when § 523(a)(8) was enacted and debtors still had the option to come back 
and have their loans discharged automatically without having to prove undue hardship). 
 71 See, e.g., H. AMEND. 939 to H.R. 4137 (offered Feb. 7, 2008) (striking down a proposed amendment to 
repeal protection afforded to private student-loan lenders). 
 72 See Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews), 661 F.2d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 
1981) (expressing a preference for a less restrictive test); see also Long v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re 
Long), 322 F.3d 549, 553 (8th Cir. 2003) (formally embracing the Andrews opinion). This approach has been 
endorsed by not only the Eighth Circuit, but also by courts within the First Circuit. Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 800 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010). 
 73 Long, 322 F.3d at 554 (citing Andrews, 661 F.2d at 704); see also Ackley v. Sallie Mae Student Loans 
(In re Ackley), 463 B.R. 146, 149 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011) (implementing a similar three-prong test). An 
expanded list of facts and circumstances to which bankruptcy courts may look to determine whether the debtor 
is entitled to an undue hardship discharge include: 
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Ultimately, in adopting the totality of the circumstances test, courts look at 
many of the same facts as those that apply the Brunner test to determine 
whether the debtor has proven undue hardship.74 
Much like the analysis under the Brunner test, a multifactor test like the 
totality of the circumstances allows for considerable amounts of judicial 
discretion and subjectivity. “The ‘totality of the circumstances’ is obviously a 
very broad test, giving [courts] considerable flexibility.”75 This test is generally 
viewed as less restrictive than the Brunner test because it allows consideration 
of a wider range of factors.76 Notably, these two tests differ in that under the 
totality of the circumstances test, no factor is dispositive; a finding against the 
debtor on a particular factor does not necessitate automatic denial of 
discharge.77 However, both tests focus on the same core considerations78—the 
debtor’s financial ability to repay and the debtor’s conduct—which has led to 
similar issues with inconsistency and judicial subjectivity. Thus, here too, 
student-loan debtors face the same systemic message that the law is slanted 
against them with little hope of escaping the unfair stereotype. 
 
(1) debtor’s total present and future incapacity to pay debts for reasons not within control of 
debtor; (2) whether debtor has made good faith effort to negotiate a deferment or forbearance of 
payment; (3) whether hardship will be long-term; (4) whether debtor has made payments on 
student loans; (5) whether debtor suffers from permanent or long-term disability; (6) ability of 
debtor to obtain gainful employment in area of study; (7) whether debtor has made good faith 
effort to maximize income and minimize expenses; (8) whether dominant purpose of bankruptcy 
petition is to discharge student loans; and (9) ratio of student loan debt to debtor’s total 
indebtedness. 
D’Ettore v. Devry Inst. of Tech. (In re D’Ettore), 106 B.R. 715, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (citations 
omitted); see also Holmes v. NCO Fin. Sys. (In re Holmes), 319 B.R. 620, 622–23 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004); 
Houshmand v. Mo. Student Loan Program (In re Houshmand), 320 B.R. 917, 920 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004); 
Morgan v. Dep’t of Higher Educ. (In re Morgan), 247 B.R. 776, 782 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000) (citing In re 
D’Ettore, 106 B.R. at 718). 
 74 See Pardo, supra note 6, at 515 nn.41–42 (showing different tests analyzing similar factors, with 
debtor illness emerging as a prominent consideration under both tests). 
 75 Houshmand, 320 B.R. at 920; see Dep’t of Educ. v. Meling (In re Meling), 263 B.R. 275, 278–79 
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001), aff’d, No. C01-2027, 2002 WL 32107248 (N.D. Iowa Jan. 22, 2002) (noting that 
courts have broad latitude to consider any relevant factor). 
 76 See Houshmand, 320 B.R. at 920. 
 77 Morgan, 247 B.R. at 782. 
 78 Weir v. Paige (In re Weir), 296 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002) (“Regardless of the test used in 
determining whether repayment of student loans constitutes undue hardship under § 523(a)(8), at a minimum 
the court must focus on two issues: (1) the economic prospects of the debtor and (2) whether the conduct of the 
debtor disqualifies the debtor from taking advantage of the exception.”). 
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C. Section 523(a)(8)’s Function as a Procedural Bar to Student-Loan Debt 
Relief 
Student-loan debtors must contend not only with the substantive difficulties 
in proving they meet the vague standard of § 523(a)(8), but they must also 
overcome the difficulty presented by the procedural requirements of the 
Bankruptcy Rules. Foremost among these hurdles is the necessity of an 
adversary proceeding to determine dischargeability.79 Once a student-loan 
creditor has established the existence of a valid claim, the debtor has the 
burden to prove he or she will suffer undue hardship without discharge relief.80 
To accomplish this, the debtor must file an adversary proceeding to “determine 
the dischargeability of a debt.”81 Unfortunately, litigation concerning an undue 
hardship discharge is, in some sense, almost antithetical to the Code’s 
approach to litigation generally. As it is most likely to occur in a situation 
where the debtor is in dire financial straits, such litigation threatens to encroach 
upon a debtor’s fresh start.82 
The Code’s approach to the protection of a debtor’s fresh start generally 
discourages excess litigation during bankruptcy proceedings. Upon filing for 
bankruptcy, the debtor is afforded protection through the automatic stay 
provision, which prevents the debtor from facing any proceedings concerning 
prebankruptcy debt, including arbitration, license revocation, and 
administrative and judicial proceedings.83 Thus, from the debtor’s perspective, 
this protection evidences the Code’s inherent hostility toward litigation over 
claims that arose before the filing of bankruptcy. 
 
 79 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6). 
 80 See In re Betz, 31 B.R. 565, 566 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1983); Conn. Student Loan Found. v. Keenan (In 
re Keenan), 53 B.R. 913, 918 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985) (finding that defendant sustained the burden of proof in 
showing undue hardship, thus allowing for the defendant’s debts to be discharged); Garneau v. N.Y. State 
Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Garneau), 122 B.R. 178, 179 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that undue 
hardship must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 81 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6). 
 82 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 189 (acknowledging four categories of cases 
concerning the creditor and debtor’s assessment of the nondischargeability status of a debt and finding that 
litigation is most likely to occur “where the creditor believes the debt to be nondischargeable and the debtor 
believes the debt to be dischargeable”). 
 83 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 50 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 
5836; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296–97. The automatic 
stay is a fundamental function of the Code to protect debtors from overzealous and encroaching creditors. See 
11 U.S.C. § 362; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 50; H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340. 
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By allowing a creditor’s claim to simply be a right to payment, which is 
presumptively valid in the absence of an objection, the Code proclaims its 
preference for efficiency and expediency in bankruptcy.84 Furthermore, the 
equality principle, which seeks to maximize a debtor’s assets through a 
common pool system of treatment of creditors, discourages individual creditor 
litigation as it will necessarily limit the recovery of all creditors by causing the 
debtor to expend resources that would normally be distributed amongst all 
creditors.85 Thus, the procedural requirements put in place by Congress seem 
adverse to the Code’s general attitude toward the litigation of pre-bankruptcy 
debts.86 
Beyond the seeming paradox of undue hardship litigation in light of the 
Code’s protective automatic stay approach, a debtor’s fresh start is also gravely 
threatened by the requirement of an adversary proceeding, which places the 
debtor at a significant disadvantage. First, to litigate a claim, the debtor will be 
forced to expend vital resources at a time when resources are scarce.87 Next, 
there is generally a power imbalance between litigants, “[a]s debtors with 
student loans are likely to owe debts to large institutional creditors that are well 
funded, legally sophisticated, and repeat players.”88 Finally, a debtor may 
attempt to prove his or her claim pro se, which may pose an almost 
insurmountable task because of the complexity of the undue hardship tests.89 
Worse yet, if a debtor is more likely to succeed with the aid of a lawyer, who 
will presumably only be available to those debtors with more resources, then 
this system imposes the most unwarranted hardship on the debtors in the worst 
financial condition.90 Thus, an adversary proceeding may place a unique 
burden on the student-loan debtor. In most cases, it is a creditor who files an 
adversary proceeding to have a debt deemed nondischargeable, but in the 
 
 84 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5)(A), 502(a); see also FED R. BANKR. P. 3001(f) (proscribing that a properly 
filed proof of claim is prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of that claim). 
 85 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 186–87. 
 86 See id. at 188 (putting forth the counterarguments that undue hardship litigation was the type of 
litigation the Code seeks to prevent). 
 87 See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 67, 124 (2006) (finding that the fresh start may be “more myth than magic bullet” and that many chapter 
7 debtors continue to have significant financial trouble post-bankruptcy). 
 88 The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 191 (alteration in original). 
 89 See supra Part I.B. 
 90 See The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6, at 191–92. Debtors with little to no resources, those 
who really have the most sympathetic cases, may be more likely to simply not bring a claim because they fear 
failure without the aid of a lawyer. Interestingly, debtors with the necessary resources to effectively litigate 
their claim are thus rewarded for declaring bankruptcy with resources in the bank, so to speak, although 
creditors can point to these resources as evidence that the debtor should not receive discharge. Id. 
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context of student loans, it is the debtor who must initiate the proceeding to 
have the debts deemed dischargeable.91 The procedural requirements of 
§ 7001(6) may threaten the debtor’s chance at a fresh start and seem to offend 
the general spirit of the Code toward prebankruptcy debt litigation, thereby 
sending the message to debtors that they face an uphill battle in their fight to 
overcome the exception to student-loan discharges. 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE SYSTEM 
Part II.A begins with an overview of the intended function of this 
Comment. Next, Part II.B addresses the unique structure of the bankruptcy 
appellate system, followed in Part II.C by an overview of the appellate process. 
Finally, Part II.D sets out theories of why parties choose to appeal the 
determination of whether a debtor has met the standard required for a student-
loan discharge under the undue hardship provision. 
A. The Function of an Appellate Study of Bankruptcy Decisions Concerning 
§ 523(a)(8) Undue Hardship Determinations 
Studying data from ten years of bankruptcy appellate cases that relate to the 
undue hardship provision can hopefully provide some systematical clarity to 
the application of an ambiguous standard and how well it comports with the 
general goals of bankruptcy. However, the unique nature of each individual’s 
bankruptcy case and of § 523(a)(8)’s conditional provision make this data 
exclusive and difficult to apply to other areas of bankruptcy law. But, there is a 
gap in the literature that has thus far failed to address the undue hardship 
determinations. Years ago, the first empirical data was catalogued to study the 
effects of the application of § 523(a)(8)’s harsh standard.92 Follow-up studies 
have explored the effects of the presence of specific debtor characteristics and 
other factors that have influenced decisions.93 Each of these studies, though, 
has only focused on the bankruptcy courts themselves; none have addressed 
 
 91 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (2012) (establishing different categories of debt that, with the exception of 
§ 523(a)(8), can be excepted from discharge and provide motivation only to creditors to initiate proceedings to 
preserve their rights to payment). 
 92 See generally Undue Hardship, supra note 6. 
 93 See generally Pardo, supra note 6 (analyzing the effect of a medical condition in an undue hardship 
proceeding); The Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6 (analyzing the effects of specific demographic, 
economic, and other variables in undue hardship proceedings); Iuliano, supra note 6 (analyzing the effects of 
many variables, including the presence of a medical condition, age, employment, income, etc., in undue 
hardship proceedings). 
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the application of the undue hardship standard in the bankruptcy appellate 
system. This Comment will attempt to address this next logical step in the 
study of §523(a)(8) by extrapolating conclusions from the appellate data in this 
study for three reasons: (1) to make practitioners aware of the prospects they 
face in each appellate option in the unique structure of the bankruptcy 
appellate system; (2) to provide the appellate courts with empirical data to 
show the effects that have been produced by the tests they have adopted and 
the attitudes and predispositions with which they approach each student-loan 
debt case they receive; and (3) to address a systemic issue that the data 
indicates is preventing debtors from accessing the justice that bankruptcy law 
is intended to provide. 
B. The Structure of the Bankruptcy Appellate System 
The bankruptcy appellate structure is unique in that it is a two-tiered 
system.94 Under this system, a debtor may appeal a decision from the 
bankruptcy court to either the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel 
(“BAP”).95 Both the district court and BAP are authorized to independently 
consider appeals, as a matter of right, from “final judgments, orders and 
 
 94 7 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. § 170:04 (3d ed. 
2008). The unique structure of the bankruptcy appellate process “can be traced to congressional reform efforts 
during the 1970s that sought to improve the quality of the bankruptcy court while simultaneously maintaining 
it in a subordinate relationship to the district court.” Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical 
Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 
1753 (2008) (footnote omitted). Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, many bankruptcy cases were delegated to 
bankruptcy referees. Id. at 1754. When the Supreme Court created the rules of bankruptcy procedure in 1973 
these bankruptcy referees became bankruptcy judges. Id. With the enactment of the Code in 1978, Congress 
rejected the possibility of vesting bankruptcy judges with Article III status, yet gave them broad jurisdictional 
powers. Id. at 1755. This choice caused disputes regarding the jurisdictional power of bankruptcy judges to 
oversee non-core proceedings, which came to a head in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). Nash & Pardo, supra, at 1755. In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court 
determined that to the extent that Article III powers had been granted to non-Article III courts (here, the 
bankruptcy courts), “[s]uch a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress’ power to 
create adjuncts to Art. III courts.” N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 87 (alteration in original). In response, 
the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 established bankruptcy courts as units of the 
district court and thereby created a system where a bankruptcy must be filed with a district court, who will 
then likely have a standing order which refers the case to a bankruptcy judge. Nash & Pardo, supra, at 1755–
56. The bankruptcy judge is then empowered to hear and definitively rule upon any of the core proceedings of 
the bankruptcy case but may only make recommendations as to non-core proceedings, which are then subject 
to de novo review by the district court if any party objects to such recommendations. Id. at 1756. Final 
decisions upon these core proceedings by the bankruptcy court are then subject to review by either the district 
court or BAP with possible review by the court of appeals to follow. Id. 
 95 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)–(b)(1) (2012). Note, that an appellant may also appeal directly to the circuit court if 
certain conditions are met. See id. § 158(d). 
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decrees of . . . bankruptcy judges.”96 Appeals from either of these courts are 
made to the appropriate circuit court of appeals,97 after which parties may seek 
discretionary review by the Supreme Court.98 The first level of appeal is 
unique to the bankruptcy system, and the savvy appellant must be familiar with 
the difference between the two options before making the initial decision of 
choosing an appellate court. The options set before the appellant are depicted 
below in Figure 1:99 
Figure 1: 

















 96 Id. § 158(a)–(b)(1). 
 97 7 NORTON & NORTON, supra note 94, § 170:04 (2008). 
 98 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
 99 Nash & Pardo, supra note 94, at 1759. 
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1), a judicial council of each circuit has the 
option to establish a BAP comprised of bankruptcy judges from that circuit, 
though not all circuits have chosen to do so.100 Furthermore, a majority of 
district judges in the district must vote in the affirmative to empower a BAP to 
hear appeals from bankruptcy courts.101 Where they exist, BAPs are the default 
forum for an appeal from the bankruptcy court,102 and the panel is comprised 
of three bankruptcy judges.103 
The stare decisis effects of decisions by district court and BAPs have been 
an issue of contention for some time. There are four predominant theories as to 
how to approach the precedential effect of these first-tier appellate decisions. 
The first approach, endorsed by Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re 
Globe Illumination Co.), posits that because the BAPs are a creation of the 
circuit courts, their decisions have the same binding authority on all 
bankruptcy courts within their respective circuit as the court of appeals.104 The 
second approach views both district courts and BAPs as intermediate appellate 
courts separating the bankruptcy court and court of appeals, giving BAP 
decisions binding precedential control over all bankruptcy courts in the circuit 
and giving district courts binding precedential control over the bankruptcy 
courts within their district.105 The third approach holds that both district court 
and BAP decisions are binding precedent only within the district from which 
the appeal arose.106 The final, and most restrictive, approach takes the position 
that the district court and BAP decisions have no precedential effect on any 
 
 100 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). To date, only five circuits (1st, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th) have elected to create a 
BAP. Ben L. Mesches, Bankruptcy Appeals, 45 TEX. J. BUS. L. 107, 128 (2013). Furthermore, Congress has 
attempted to encourage the creation of more BAPs. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (stating that “[t]he judicial 
council of a circuit shall establish a bankruptcy appellate panel”). 
 101 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). 
 102 Id. § 158(c)(1). 
 103 Id. § 158(b)(5) (stating that the members of the panel cannot be from the same district from which the 
appeal originates). 
 104 Coyne v. Westinghouse Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 1993) (“The bankruptcy courts throughout the circuit certainly must be bound by a BAP decision.”). Dicta 
within this case also asserted that in matters of bankruptcy, the BAP may even have superiority over the 
district court, although this view was rejected by many district courts asserting that their power as an Art. III 
court is not trumped by a BAP. See Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Far W. Fed. Bank v. Vanasen (In re Vanasen), 81 B.R. 59, 62 (D. Or. 1987). 
 105 See In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 70 B.R. 618, 622 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 841 
F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Proudfoot, 144 B.R. 876, 878–79 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992) (citing In re Windmill 
Farms, 70 B.R. at 622); In re Gen. Associated Investors Ltd. P’ship, 150 B.R. 756, 760–61 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
1993). 
 106 See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Zamora (In re Silverman), 616 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1679 (2011); In re Warren, 91 B.R. 930 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988). 
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court concerning these matters.107 These different approaches are further 
evidence of the complexity of the bankruptcy system and the need for a 
practitioner to be well versed in and aware of the local practices in his or her 
district. 
With the general bankruptcy appellate structure and the precedential nature 
of both first-tier appellate options in mind, the next important step for an 
appellant is to consider both the qualitative and quantitative factors that should 
affect an appellant’s choice at the first-tier appellate level. The results of a 
2008 empirical study by Professors Jonathan Nash and Rafael Pardo (the 
“Nash/Pardo study”) of three years of bankruptcy appellate opinions from both 
the first- and second-tier appellate levels suggest that: (1) “courts of appeals 
are more likely to uphold upon review the conclusions of BAPs than district 
courts” and (2) “BAP decisions are . . . cited more frequently . . . than are 
district court decisions.”108 
Professors Nash and Pardo posited that BAP decisions have a higher level 
of quality based on two primary observations: (1) objective characteristics of 
quality appellate review and (2) opinion affirmance and citation rates.109 The 
results of their study confirmed that the BAP may indeed provide higher 
quality appellate review than district courts.110 The Nash/Pardo study based 
this conclusion on both a comparison of the traditional factors that might 
indicate quality appellate review and the statistical results from three years of 
bankruptcy decisions.111 
Recognizing the difficulty in addressing every possible factor that might 
contribute to quality appellate review, Pardo and Nash stated that “the 
academic literature does suggest several attributes that will tend to contribute 
to better review,”112 and they are as follows: (1) “panels of judges;” (2) 
“expertise of the appellate decisionmaking body in the subject matter of the 
appeals it hears;” (3) “general ‘lawfinding ability;’” (4) “the extent to which an 
 
 107 See In re Rheuban 128 B.R. 551 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1991). The reasoning behind such a view is that the 
BAP and district court are on the same level and thus one does not control the other, and because bankruptcy 
courts are units of the district courts and district court decisions do not bind other district court judges, the 
bankruptcy courts are not controlled by either appellate court. See Rinard v. Positive Invs., Inc. (In re Rinard), 
451 B.R. 12, 21 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). 
 108 Nash & Pardo, supra note 94, at 1747. 
 109 Id. at 1769–74. 
 110 See id. at 1775 n.112. 
 111 Id. at 1791. 
 112 Id. at 1748. 
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appellate court conforms to traditional appellate hierarchy;” and (5) “judicial 
independence.”113 
The Nash/Pardo study concluded that BAPs have more of the 
abovementioned features of quality appellate review than do district courts.114 
First, BAPs decide cases in three-judge panels as opposed to a single district 
court judge deciding a case alone, giving BAPs the inherent advantage of 
reviewing a case with three judges instead of one.115 Second, because BAP 
judges are, “by virtue of their appointment as bankruptcy judges,” presumably 
experts in bankruptcy law, they are better suited to resolve issues in core 
bankruptcy proceedings than their district court counterparts.116 With regard to 
the third factor—general lawfinding ability—the Nash/Pardo study concluded 
that neither court has any innate advantage.117 Fourth, the study found BAPs 
conform more to the traditional notion of appellate review than do district 
courts.118 Finally, the study concluded that, concerning the factor of judicial 
independence, district court judges have an advantage over BAPs.119 In 
reflection, the BAPs clearly possess more of the academically suggested 
features of quality appellate review than do their district court counterparts. 
The Nash/Pardo study also found that BAPs have a higher perceived level 
of quality appellate review based on two broad categories of their findings 
 
 113 Id. at 1748–52 (footnotes omitted). The Nash/Pardo study can be consulted for more information 
concerning the rationale of why these factors are considered to be indicators of quality appellate review. 
 114 Id. at 1759. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 1759–60. 
 117 Id. at 1760. 
 118 Id. at 1761–62 (footnote omitted) (stating that BAP “rulings are generally seen to be binding on future 
bankruptcy appellate panels drawn from the same circuit . . . . In contrast, one district judge is generally not 
bound to follow the ruling of another district judge . . . .”). 
 119 Id. at 1765. However, the Nash/Pardo study went on to establish that this advantage held by district 
court judges was slim at best. On the one hand, district court judges are Article III judges, appointed with life 
tenure and a guarantee of nonreduction in salary. Id. On the other hand, bankruptcy judges receive neither of 
these benefits as they are not Article III judges. Id. But, Professors Nash and Pardo go on to demonstrate that 
this perceived inequality is only marginal. Id. First, although bankruptcy judges only serve a fourteen-year 
term, their appointments can be and often are renewed; few bankruptcy judges leave for lack of reappointment. 
Id. at 1765–66. Second, the removal process for bankruptcy judges is, in reality, very similar to that of Article 
III judges and has not produced results that would likely prevent a bankruptcy judge from acting 
independently. Id. at 1766–67. Third, because the bankruptcy judges’ salaries have been pegged at 92% of the 
salary of a district court judge since 1987, the bankruptcy judges enjoy a substantially similar fixed 
compensation as a district court judge. Id. at 1767. Finally, Professors Nash and Pardo surmise that, given the 
appointment process of bankruptcy judges, they “may be better situated than district judges to resist the 
political influence that would threaten to compromise an independent judiciary.” Id. 
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related to affirmances and citations.120 Findings in both of these categories 
sought to test the “correctness” of decisions originating from the BAP and the 
district courts.121 Confirming the authors’ hypotheses, the data indicated that 
BAP decisions were more often affirmed and positively cited, which “tends to 
validate theoreticians’ claims about the ideal attributes of appellate review.”122 
This Comment will seek to build on these results and provide further 
considerations of the Nash/Pardo findings in light of the study’s results. 
C. The Bankruptcy Appellate Process 
The unique structure of the bankruptcy appellate process can be a difficult 
hurdle for the student-loan debtor to overcome, but the procedural 
requirements of this process also present challenges for a debtor. At the 
inception of a case, original bankruptcy jurisdiction is vested in the U.S. 
district courts,123 which may create standing orders to refer bankruptcy cases to 
bankruptcy judges within the district.124 These bankruptcy judges are Article I 
judges appointed by the court of appeals125 and “may hear and determine all 
cases under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in 
a case under title 11.”126 As such, these judges are empowered to make 
“determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts.”127 Bankruptcy 
courts have the statutory authority to rule definitively on these proceedings, 
subject to review by an appellate court.128 To obtain a ruling on the 
dischargeability of a student-loan debt, a debtor must initiate an adversary 
proceeding at this initial stage of the bankruptcy process by filing a 
complaint.129 
From the final judgment of a bankruptcy court regarding the 
dischargeability of a debt, an appellant may appeal to either the district court or 
the BAP.130 Although the BAP, where one has been established, is the default 
 
 120 Id. at 1804–05. 
 121 Id. at 1770. 
 122 Id. at 1807. 
 123 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)–(b) (2012). 
 124 Id. § 157(a). 
 125 Id. § 152(a)(1). 
 126 Id. § 157(b)(1). 
 127 Id. § 157(b)(2)(I). 
 128 Id. § 157(b)(1). 
 129 FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(6), 7003. 
 130 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b)(1) (authorizing the creation of the BAP and empowering it to hear appeals with 
consent of the parties). 
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appellate option from a bankruptcy court, an appellant or any other party may 
elect to have the appeal heard by the district court.131 From the final ruling of 
the BAP or district court, a party may appeal to the appropriate court of 
appeal.132 
The procedural requirements for an appeal are rigorous for any debtor, but 
they can be especially difficult for a pro se debtor.133 An appeal from the final 
judgment, order, or decree of the bankruptcy court must be filed with the clerk 
within fourteen days of entry of the ruling.134 Failure to do so will result in the 
dismissal of the appeal.135 In addition, within the fourteen day window the 
appellant must file “a designation of the items to be included in the record on 
appeal and a statement of the issues to be presented.”136 This record includes 
the “items so designated by the parties, the notice of appeal, the judgment, 
order, or decree appealed from, and any opinion, findings of fact, and 
conclusions of law of the court,” and, if needed, “a written request for the 
transcript,” all of which the appellant bears the costs of providing.137 
Having jumped through the procedural hoops to initiate an appeal, a debtor-
appellant faces a difficult task to overturn a bankruptcy court’s findings of fact. 
An appellate court reviews the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact under a 
clearly erroneous standard.138 Furthermore, “where there are two permissible 
 
 131 Id. § 158(c)(1) (allowing for an election of the district court as long as the party does so within 30 days 
of notice of appeal). The district court has jurisdiction to hear such appeals under § 158(a).  
 132 Id. § 158(d)(1). 
 133 See Lark v. Bd. of Trs. (In re Lark), No. CC-09-1239, 2010 WL 6451889, at *4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 
4, 2010) (dismissing debtor’s case because she failed to provide a transcript for review). 
 134 FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(f)(3)(D). 
 135 Id. 8001(a) (“An appellant’s failure to take any step other than timely filing a notice of appeal does not 
affect the validity of the appeal . . . .”) (emphasis added). Put another way, while other errors in perfecting 
one’s appeal, such as an untimely designation of the record, do not affect the appeal’s validity, failure to timely 
file the notice of appeal does affect the appeal’s validity. 
 136 Id. 8006. 
 137 Id. It should be noted from the outset that these requirements can be difficult for a pro se debtor who is 
unfamiliar with not only the law in general, but the specific practices of the bankruptcy appellate process. In 
just the cases reviewed for this Comment’s study, many were found to be dismissed because of a procedural 
error of the debtor-appellant. See Lark, 2010 WL 6451889, at *6 (dismissing debtor’s case because she failed 
to provide a transcript for review); Hough v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Hough), 128 F. App’x 
369 (5th Cir. 2005) (finding the case unable to be examined because pro se debtor failed to provide 
transcripts); Looper v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. 3:07-cv-306, 2008 WL 2965887, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July 
30, 2008) (dismissing debtor’s case for failure to file a motion to extend the time to file a brief within the 
fourteen day timeframe). 
 138 Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United Student Aid 
Funds (In re Pena), 155 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998)); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Frushour (In re 
Frushour), 433 F.3d 393, 398 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous.”139 Applying this lenient standard, appellate judges often do not 
overturn factual findings by the bankruptcy court, even if they would have 
chosen differently.140 The debtor-appellant then must show that the bankruptcy 
court somehow erred in the calculation of income, expenses, or any other 
factual bases that might be used to determine whether the debtor met the 
standard required for a discharge under the undue hardship provision.141 
Because the majority of appellate cases do not involve a challenge to the 
lower court’s factual findings,142 the focus at the appellate level is often on the 
question of whether the debtor satisfied the applicable test to prove that he or 
she would have an undue hardship without a discharge. Both appellate tiers in 
the bankruptcy system “review directly the bankruptcy court’s decision.”143 
Because the determination of whether the facts of a particular debtor’s case 
meet the requisite standard to prove undue hardship involves applying facts to 
legal standards, the standard of review, as shown below, must be clearly 
defined to afford an effective appellate procedure: 
Whether a debtor has met the undue hardship standard is a legal 
conclusion that is based on the debtor’s individual factual 
circumstances. It is thus a mixed question of law and fact. As we 
have explained in a related context, these types of questions are 
reviewed “under a hybrid standard, applying to the factual portion of 
each inquiry the same standard applied to questions of pure fact and 
examining de novo the legal conclusions derived from those 
facts.” . . . We therefore review de novo the determination of whether 
 
 139 Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. Birrane (In re Birrane), 287 B.R. 490, 494 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2002) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 
 140 See Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency v. McDay, No. Civ.A.AW 04 2630, 2005 WL 5327774, at *3 
(D. Md. Feb. 9, 2005) (noting that the bankruptcy court, as the trial court, is in the best position to judge the 
credibility of those who testify at the trial). Notably, in the majority of the cases analyzed for this Comment’s 
study, either the parties did not contest the bankruptcy court’s factual findings or the appellate court quickly 
stated that the factual findings of the bankruptcy court were not clearly erroneous and thus accepted. See infra 
Part III.A.  
 141 See Walker v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Walker), 650 F.3d 1227, 1230 (8th Cir. 2011) (“We 
will not upset those findings of fact unless, after reviewing the entire record, we are left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”). 
 142 Only 32% of cases in this Comment’s study contained issues of fact. More often than not, the parties 
did not contest the underlying court’s factual findings and the court then simply accepted the lower court’s 
findings of facts. See infra Part III.A. 
 143 Frushour, 433 F.3d at 398 (stating that the court of appeals reviews directly). As well, both the BAP 
and district court review the bankruptcy court’s decision directly because they are the first appellate level. 
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a debtor has met the undue hardship standard, and we review the 
factual underpinnings of that legal conclusion for clear error.144 
The de novo review applied by an appellate court is problematic, though, for 
an appellant because it places the appellate judges in the same positions as the 
bankruptcy judge, equally prone to the inherent subjectivity and inconsistency 
seen in the lower court.145 Because appellate judges review the determination 
de novo, they might apply a harsher standard to the facts of the case simply 
because they were not present at the bankruptcy trial.146 In addition, where the 
debtor may feel that they have a decent chance of relief at the appellate level 
because the case was close at the bankruptcy court level, in reality, appellate 
courts often cite to congressional intent to make student-loan discharge 
difficult, to presumptive nondischargeability, and to negative student-loan 
debtor stereotypes to justify a strict approach to an undue hardship 
determination.147 In sum, debtors face many of the same difficulties in 
appellate review that they first confronted at the bankruptcy court level. 
D. Why Appeal? 
In light of the difficulties noted above, debtors may be hesitant to appeal 
decisions of the bankruptcy courts. Theoretically, one might imagine four 
scenarios in which an appeal may be made based on whether the debtor or 
creditor is willing to appeal: 
 Creditor not willing to 
appeal 
Creditor willing to 
appeal 
Debtor not willing to 
appeal No appeal occurs Appeal occurs 
Debtor willing to 
appeal 
Appeal occurs Appeal occurs 
Of course, where neither the creditor nor the debtor believes they have a good 
case, neither party will appeal, thus accepting the court’s determination. 
 
 144 Id. at 398–99 (citations omitted). 
 145 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 146 See generally Tirch v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Tirch), 409 F.3d 677, 681 (6th Cir. 
2005) (declining to affirm a discharge of student-loan debt based partly on the determination that testimony 
from the debtor at trial as to her medical condition, without supporting documentation or testimony by doctors, 
was insufficient to satisfy the standard). 
 147 See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 780, 782 (8th Cir. 2009); Educ. Credit 
Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1306 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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However, assuming that a debtor does not want to appeal because they have 
won in the bankruptcy court, a creditor may appeal for the obvious reason that 
they believe they should have won in the lower court. Evidence from the cases 
used in this Comment’s study suggests another possible reason the creditor 
may appeal. In some of the first tier cases, repeat players, like Educational 
Credit Management Corp., were observed focusing primarily on trying to get 
the appellate court to create per se rules, creating a narrower exception for 
debtors by which they might gain a student-loan discharge.148 Similarly, when 
the creditor does not want to appeal but the debtor does, it is likely the result 
that the creditor won in the bankruptcy court, but the debtor believes they have 
a strong case on which to appeal. Evidence of this can be seen in some of the 
cases from this Comment’s study where a debtor with a medical condition 
appealed an unfavorable decision at the bankruptcy court level.149  
 However, if the debtor does have a strong case, why might the creditor not 
choose to simply settle? The likely explanation is that the creditor feels, having 
already won in the bankruptcy court, that their side is the stronger of the two, 
but, once again, they may simply move forward with an appeal because of 
desire to create per se rules with binding precedential authority. Finally, there 
is the situation where both sides might be willing to appeal, and indeed both 
sides may cross-appeal. As an appeal requires further financial outlay for 
already cash-strapped debtors, they will likely only be willing to appeal if they 
believe they have a strong overall case with the best chance of winning on 
appeal. Creditors, as repeat players, have significantly more financial resources 
 
 148 See Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 487 F.3d 353, 363–64 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(showing ECMC pushing for a per se rule that not pursuing an Income Contingent Repayment Plan must mean 
that the debtor fails the good faith prong); Frushour, 433 F.3d at 400 (showing ECMC asking for per se rule 
that have Internet and cable connections requires the conclusions that a debtor is maintaining more than a 
minimal standard of living); Polleys, 356 F.3d at 1311 (showing ECMC pushing for per se rule that medical 
disability is required in order to satisfy the future inability prong); Saxman v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re 
Saxman), 325 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2003) (showing ECMC pushing for per se rule that partial discharge through 
use of 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) is unacceptable); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Smith, No. H-11-57, 2011 WL 
4625397 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011) (showing ECMC pushing for per se rule that a low paying job alone is not 
enough to satisfy the requirements of the future inability prong); McLaney v. Ky. Higher Educ. Assistance 
Auth. (In re McLaney), 375 B.R. 666 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (showing ECMC pushing for a per se rule that tithing 
is not an allowable expense). 
 149 Prevailing studies suggest that a medical condition significantly increases the chances of satisfying the 
undue hardship standard, and thus those with medical conditions that lost in the initial case might think they 
have a greater chance to succeed on appeal; see Pardo, supra note 6, at 511; Roe v. Coll. Access Network (In 
re Roe), 295 F. App’x 927 (10th Cir. 2008); Nash v. Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188 
(1st Cir. 2006); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Barrett (In re Barrett), 337 B.R. 896 (B.A.P. 6th 2006); State 
Univ. N.Y.-Student Loan Serv. Ctr. v. Menezes, 352 B.R. 8 (D. Mass. 2006). 
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and are invested in the process as a whole with a view that goes beyond the 
case-at-hand.150 
Given the existence of an affirmance bias in appellate courts,151 the reason 
must indeed be strong for the creditor or debtor to choose to appeal. However, 
the debtor may proceed simply because they have little to lose. Already in the 
bankruptcy process, the debtor may just hope for a better result from the de 
novo review of the bankruptcy court’s undue hardship determination.152 The 
creditor, for similar reasons, may also seek to take advantage of the de novo 
review standard to overturn a bankruptcy court decision that was unfavorable 
to them. In addition, creditors, as repeat players, may know of the appellate 
courts’ reputation for strict review of the undue hardship determination153 and 
may also proceed in an attempt to create per se rules that would aid them in 
future cases. 
III.  THE APPELLATE STUDY 
In this Part, this Comment presents the results from the study performed. 
This Part will begin first with a discussion of the methodology implemented in 
the selection of the opinions chosen for analysis in this study. Then, the 
findings from data gleaned from those opinions will be presented to show the 
harsh reality that debtors face in the appellate system. 
A. Selection Criteria and Methodology 
Before presenting the findings of this study, it is important to explain the 
methodology used to select the opinions that made up the group from which 
the data for this study was obtained. The purpose of this study was to survey 
the entire appellate landscape as it related to review of bankruptcy court 
determinations of whether a debtor had satisfied the undue hardship 
requirement of § 523(a)(8). Thus, the study attempted to encompass opinions 
from every circuit and as many districts as possible. This was done in an 
attempt to provide data that would be representative of judicial doctrine 
 
 150 This means they may make choices that, though they may not prove fruitful in this particular case, may 
result in favorable rules they can use in later cases in which they know they will take part. 
 151 Nash & Pardo, supra note 94, at 960 (noting that “appellate review standards create an affirmance 
bias”) (citing FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 48–49 (2007)). 
 152 See Frushour, 433 F.3d at 398–99 (explaining the appellate review de novo standard). 
 153 See Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001); McLaney, 375 B.R. at 
673; Geyer v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Geyer), 344 B.R. 129, 131 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. 
DeGroot, 339 B.R. 201, 206 (D. Or. 2006). 
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developed across the country.154 As such, this data is a starting point for future 
studies to better inform practitioners and judges in specific circuits and judicial 
districts. 
In light of these goals, the study began with a search of Westlaw’s FBKR-
CS database155 with the following terms and connectors: 523(A)(8) & 
PR(“COURT OF APPEALS” “BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL” 
“DISTRICT COURT”) & da(aft 12/31/2001 & bef 01/01/2012). This restricted 
the results to those opinions issued by courts of appeals, BAPs, and district 
courts who used the phrase “523(a)(8)” within their opinion, and whose 
opinions were issued in a ten year date range beginning on January 1, 2002 and 
ending on December 31, 2011. Theoretically, this narrowed the study’s focus 
to appellate opinions that addressed the provisions of § 523(a)(8), although it is 
important to note that an opinion that dealt with these provision but did not cite 
to the Code would have fallen by the wayside. However, it is unlikely that 
many opinions of this nature exist. This initial search produced 289 results, all 
of which were studied regardless of whether the decisions had been published 
in the Federal Reporter, Federal Appendix, or the Bankruptcy Reporter. The 
rationale for including these unpublished results was that they still had 
significant value as they documented the appellate court decision-making 
process and yielded valuable data to form a more well-rounded view of the 
average debtor on appeal. After pouring through each of these opinions and 
coding for the variables used in the study, the result yielded 144 opinions that 
dealt directly with an undue hardship determination on appeal, while the 
remaining 145 opinions merely cited to § 523(a)(8) for other purposes. 
The opinions that dealt directly with an undue hardship determination 
represented a fair cross-section of judicial circuits as illustrated in Bar Charts 1 




 154 It is important to note that by studying only judicial opinions, this study fails to encompass the many 
cases that are settled or disposed of by other means. 
 155 Westlaw is a commercial electronic database that can be accessed via internet at http://www.westlaw. 
com. 
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These charts reflect the representative nature of this study, which allows the 
following findings to have a wider degree of applicability across the United 
States. 
Each of these opinions was coded for key variables to provide data for 
analysis. Many of these variables have been previously identified as influential 
on the decision-making processes for judges.156 These variables included: (1) 
whether the debtor was an appellant; (2) whether there was an issue of law or 
fact in the case; (3) the debtor’s filing status as joint or individual; (4) whether 
the debtor was pro se; (5) the debtor’s household income and expenses; (6) the 
debtor’s employment status; (7) whether the debtor or a dependent had a 
medical condition; (8) the debtor’s age; (9) the amount of debt at stake in the 
case; (10) the creditor’s identity; and (11) the basis of the appellate court’s 
decision. These variables, combined with key identification information,157 
provide the data necessary to make some key findings as to how the debtor 
fares in the appellate arena. 
B. The Findings from a Study of Undue Hardship Appellate Court 
Determinations 
Appellate courts applying the undue hardship provision have substantially 
ruled against discharge of student-loan debt. Theoretically, the provision in 
§ 523(a)(8) allows the honest but unfortunate debtor the opportunity to 
discharge onerous student-loan debt. The Brunner court presumably had this 
goal in mind when it formally adopted the test to determine dischargeability.158 
“Many subsequent courts employing the Brunner analysis, however, appear to 
have constrained the three Brunner requirements to deny discharge under even 
the most dire circumstances.”159 This raises the question of what message the 
appellate courts are sending concerning the availability of student-loan debt 
discharge. 
 
 156 See Undue Hardship, supra note 6; Pardo, supra note 6; Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The 
Real Student-Loan Scandal, supra note 6; Iuliano, supra note 6. 
 157 This simply includes the case name, appellate court identification, citation, location, and disposition of 
the case. 
 158 Brunner v. New York State Higher Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2nd Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam). 
 159 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys, 356 F.3d 1302, 1308 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (noting 
that Congress clearly enacted § 523(a)(8) only in an attempt to curb the abuse of the bankruptcy system by 
these stereotypical debtors with lots of earning potential but high debts they want to get rid of). 
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The primary focus of this Comment is to ascertain, based on empirical data, 
the message being sent from the appellate opinions for a student-loan debtor, 
especially as it relates to concerns about access to justice. The quote above 
brings to the forefront this concern about student-loan debtors and the 
difficulties they face trying to access the protection that the bankruptcy system 
is intended to provide. Figure 1 illustrates this key concern by showing the 
lopsided results in favor of the creditor at the appellate level: 
Figure 1: Success On Appeal by Appellant Type 
Appellant 
          Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
41 48 89 
46.07% 53.93% 100.00% 
Debtor 
43 10 53 
81.13% 18.87% 100.00% 
 84 58 142 
Total 59.15% 40.85% 100.00% 
  Pearson chi2 (1) = 16.9039 Pr. = 0.0001   
Applying a chi-squared test160 with one degree of freedom to compare whether 
there is a correlation between the appellant and their success on appeal, the 
results revealed a statistically significant finding161 that the student-loan debtor 
often failed to achieve success. Absent a relationship between the appellant 
and their success on appeal, one would expect to see a debtor-appellant 
succeed in approximately 40.85% of the cases and fail in 59.15% of the cases. 
The data reveals that debtors actually succeed in approximately 18.87% of 
cases and fail in 81.13% of cases. This shocking deviation from the expected 
results shows that debtors face substantial challenges on appeal. 
Seeing that debtors are often unsuccessful in appealing their cases, the 
question then becomes “why are they unsuccessful?”162 A major indicator that 
appellate courts were engaging in an overly harsh view to start is the fact that 
many cases began their analysis by noting that student loans are 
 
 160 See generally ALAN AGRESTI, CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS (1990). 
 161 Here, there was less than a 0.0001 probability that random chance alone would have yielded a 
difference as large as that witnessed between the observed and expected values. It is generally accepted that 
where the probability is less than .05, or 5%, the finding is statistically significant and thus indicates that there 
is a correlative relationship between the two variables. 
 162 To fully answer this would require expositions of every case in the study, but the purpose of this study 
was to see if there were any indicators in the empirical data that could answer this question. 
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“presumptively nondischargeable.”163 But, using the empirical data, this study 
attempted to ascertain whether any single factor gave the debtor a better 
chance on appeal. To accomplish this, the study considered the effects of: (1) 
debtor representation; (2) the presence of a medical condition; (3) other 
variables related to household characteristics; (4) geographic considerations; 
(5) repeat, institutional creditors; and (6) district v. BAP courts. This 
Subsection will discuss each of these in turn. 
1. Debtor Representation 
 The first consideration was whether debtors were represented by counsel. 
Hoping to find a correlation between a debtor’s representation and success on 
appeal, the data was analyzed using chi squared tests. Figures 2 and 3 show the 
results when the debtor proceeded pro se or represented, respectively: 
Figure 2: Pro Se Debtor Success On Appeal 
Appellant 
     Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
34 39 73 
46.58% 53.42% 100.00% 
Debtor 
22 6 28 
78.57% 21.43% 100.00% 
Total 
56 45 101 
55.45% 44.55% 100.00% 
  Pearson chi2 (1) = 8.3868 Pr. = 0.004   
  
Figure 3: Represented Debtor Success On Appeal 
Appellant 
       Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
6 7 13 
46.15% 53.85% 100.00% 
Debtor 
21 4 25 
84.00% 16.00% 100.00% 
Total 
27 11 38 
71.05% 28.95% 100.00% 
  Pearson chi2 (1) = 5.9560 Pr. = 0.015   
 
 163 See Rifino v. United States (In re Rifino), 245 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2001); McLaney v. Ky. 
Higher Educ. Assistance Authority (In re McLaney), 375 B.R. 666, 673 (M.D. Ala. 2007); Educ. Credit Mgmt. 
Corp. v. DeGroot, 339 B.R. 201, 206 (D. Or. 2006); Geyer v. Dep’t of Educ. (In re Geyer), 344 B.R. 129, 131 
(S.D. Cal. 2006).  
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These charts show a statistically significant correlation between the appellant 
and whether the debtor was pro se or represented. Interestingly, the debtor had 
substantially more overall success, 39.60% compared to 26.32%,164 when he or 
she was pro se. However, the debtor had only marginally better success as a 
pro se litigant when the appellant was the debtor, 21.43% compared to 16.00%. 
There are two possible explanations for these findings. First, in cases where 
the debtor was represented, the court might have more carefully reviewed the 
debtor’s ability to pay because the debtor had the money to pay for counsel. 
And second, when the pro se debtor was the appellant, they were much more 
likely to have a graduate-level degree,165 which might indicate better earning 
potential. This earning potential often affected the judge’s perception of 
whether a particular hardship was likely to endure and, therefore, whether the 
debtor would fail under the second Brunner prong, which could explain why 
the findings between pro se and represented debtor-appellants were so similar. 
2. Medical Condition 
Studies have indicated that the presence of a medical condition plays a 
large role in a bankruptcy court’s dischargeability finding.166 Theorizing that a 
medical condition might also play prominently in appellate courts, the above 
tests were duplicated to see if the presence of a medical condition indicated a 
higher chance of success for the debtor. Figures 4167 and 5 show this analysis: 
Figure 4: Success Rate With No Medical Condition Present 
Appellant 
      Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
17 33 50 
34.00% 66.00% 100.00% 
Debtor 
29 6 35 
82.86% 17.14% 100.00% 
Total 
46 39 85 
54.12% 45.88% 100.00% 
  Pearson chi2 (1) = 19.7920 Pr. = 0.0001   
 
 164 Total success rate = (number of cases appealed by creditors that they lost + number of cases appealed 
by debtors that they won) / total number of cases observed. 
 165 Many times a law degree. 
 166 Pardo, supra note 6, at 509–12 (finding in a study of a decade of bankruptcy decisions that the debtor’s 
health played the largest role, even eclipsing a debtor’s monthly household income and expenses, in a 
bankruptcy court’s determination of undue hardship). 
 167 Analysis includes cases that did not mention the debtor or the health of the debtor’s depenedent. 
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In the absence of a relationship between debtors with no medical condition and 
their success on appeal, one would expect to see the debtor-appellant to 
succeed in approximately 45.88% of the cases. The data reveals that debtors 
with no medical condition succeed in only 17.14% of cases where they are the 
appellant. Analysis pursuant to a chi-square test with one degree of freedom 
indicates that there is less than a 0.0001 probability that random chance alone 
would have yielded a difference as large as that witnessed between the 
observed and expected values. Debtors with no medical condition also had less 
success when the creditor appealed compared to the overall results when a 
creditor appealed in Figure 1.168 
Figure 5: Success Rate With Medical Condition Present 
Appellant 
        Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
24 15 39 
61.54% 38.46% 100.00% 
Debtor 
14 4 18 
77.78% 22.22% 100.00% 
Total 
38 19 57 
66.67% 33.33% 100.00% 
  Pearson chi2 (1) = 1.4615 Pr. = 0.227   
 While the results of Figure 5 did not reveal a statistically significant 
relationship between the appellant and success rate when the debtor had a 
medical condition, a comparison of these results with other data reveal a 
noteworthy finding. In Figure 1, the results showed that when debtors appealed 
they succeeded in 18.87% of cases, and when creditors appealed, they 
succeeded in 53.93% of cases. As well, in Figure 4, the results showed that 
when debtors have no medical condition, they succeed in only 17.14% of 
cases, whereas when creditors appealed, they succeeded in 66.00% of cases. In 
Figure 5, though, when debtors have a medical condition, they succeeded in 
22.22% of cases in which they were the appellant, and creditors succeeded in 
only 38.46% of cases in which they were the appellant. 
These results indicate that, while the debtor is not guaranteed to succeed, 
the presence of a medical condition seemed to level the playing field. In this 
situation, creditors lose the substantial advantage they hold in most other 
 
 168 34.00% success with no medical condition compared to the overall debtor success rate when creditors 
appeal, 46.07%. 
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circumstances.169 Furthermore, there is evidence from the cases studied that 
suggests that some debtors with medical conditions could have succeeded with 
relatively small changes in their approach. For example, some debtors with 
medical conditions failed on appeal because the only evidence of their 
condition and its effect was their own testimony, something that could have 
been easily remedied by the production of supportive documentation by 
doctors.170 
3. Household Characteristics 
Theorizing that household characteristics might provide explanation for the 
negative student-loan debtor appellate results, this study focused on income, 
expenses, and average debt as a possible predictor of appellate outcomes. 
However, using summary statistics and logistic regressions, the data showed 
there was no statistically significant relationship between any of these 
variables and success on appeal.171 The fact that there was no statistically 
significant relationship is important in and of itself in that it shows that debtors 
across the spectrum received relatively consistent treatment. This is notable 
because it reveals that this area of bankruptcy law has attained consistency in 
one aspect—its equally harsh treatment of student-loan debtors, no matter their 
financial status. 
4. Geography 
Next, the study catalogued and analyzed geographical information to see if 
there was any correlation between where the debtor’s case originated and 
success on appeal. Tables A16–26 in the Appendix show the results of 
applying two different bivariate statistical tests172 to assess the debtor’s success 
rate by circuit. Though debtors seemed to fare better in some circuits than in 
 
 169 In each situation, the observed results were much closer to the expected values. 
 170 These debtors only provided prognoses of the outlook of their condition based on their own testimony 
and did not produce medical experts, or doctors, to testify on their behalf as to the prospects of their conditions 
going forward. See Roe v. Coll. Access Network (In re Roe), 295 F. App’x 927 (10th Cir. 2008); Nash v. 
Conn. Student Loan Found. (In re Nash), 446 F.3d 188 (1st Cir. 2006); State Univ. N.Y.-Student Loan Serv. 
Ctr. v. Menezes, 352 B.R. 8 (D. Mass. 2006); Barrett v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Barrett), 337 B.R. 
896 (6th B.A.P. 2006). 
 171 See infra Appendix, Tables A1–15. 
 172 Fischer’s exact and chi squared tests. See generally AGRESTI, supra note 160. These tests are 
performing the same analysis as originally shown in Figure 1 for overall success rates on appeal. 
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others,173 none of the above tests revealed any statistical significance to the 
success rate findings, thus indicating that geography is not necessarily 
important in determining whether or not the debtor will find success. In sum, 
the student-loan debtor—no matter his or her income expenses, or location—
faces a system that consistently rules in favor of the creditor more often and is 
more willing to overturn decisions favorable to the debtor. 
5. Institutional Creditors 
The study next sought to determine the effect of key repeat creditors and 
how their presence in a case affected the debtor’s prospects on appeal. An 
analysis of the creditors in each case with full dispositions174 revealed two 
standouts: Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”),175 who 
made up 67.61% of the cases, and the U.S. Department of Education 
(“USDOE”), who comprised 11.27% of the cases. Figures 6 and 7 show the 
effect of the presence of ECMC in a case: 
Figure 6: Appeals by Debtors 
Appellee 
   Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Other 
Creditor 
20 2 22 
90.91% 9.09% 100.00% 
ECMC 
 
23 8 31 
74.19% 25.81% 100.00% 
Total 











 173 It is noteworthy that in the 8th Circuit, which applies the more lenient totality of circumstances test, 
debtors in the cases studied actually performed terribly when they were the appellant. See infra Appendix, 
Table A23 (showing that debtors succeeded in 0.00% of cases). However, when the creditor was the appellant, 
the debtor succeeded in 71.43% of cases studied, possibly indicating that under the totality of the 
circumstances test, courts may be more likely to uphold decisions that favor the debtor. Id. 
 174 There are a total of 142 cases where there is either a “full affirm” or “no affirm” disposition. 
 175 “ECMC is a national guaranty agency, a national student loan bankruptcy servicer, and a contractor for 
the U.S. Department of Education, providing collection services and document management services.” Educ. 
Credit Mgmt. Corp., ECMC–FAQ–General, ECMC, http://www.ecmc.org/details/faqGeneral.html#question3. 
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Figure 7: Appeals by Creditors 
Appellant 
          Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Other 
Creditor 
13 11 24 
54.17% 45.83% 100.00% 
ECMC 
 
28 37 65 
43.08% 56.92% 100.00% 
Total 
 
41 48 89 
46.07% 53.93% 100.00% 
  Pearson chi2(1) = 0.8676 Pr = 0.352   
 The above chi squared and Fisher’s exact tests reveal that whether in debtor 
appeals or creditor appeals, ECMC’s success rate is not statistically 
significantly different than the success rates of other creditors.  Based on its 
experience as a significant repeat player, I expected to see ECMC’s 
performance to be statistically significantly better than other creditors, but the 
results above show that while ECMC fared better than other creditors when the 
creditor in a case was the appellant, the difference in performance had no 
statistical significance. 
Figures 8 and 9 reflect the application of a Fisher’s exact test to determine 
the effects when the USDOE was the creditor in a case: 
Figure 8: Appeals by Debtors 
Appellee 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Other 
Creditor 
36 8 44 
81.82% 18.18% 100.00% 
USDOE 
 
7 2 9 
77.78% 22.22% 100.00% 
Total 
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Figure 9: Appeals by Creditors 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Other 
Creditor 
35 47 82 
42.68% 57.32% 100.00% 
USDOE 
 
6 1 7 
85.71% 14.29% 100.00% 
Total 
 
41 48 89 
46.07% 53.93% 100.00% 
  Fisher’s exact = 0.045                      1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.546 
The above Fisher’s exact tests reveal that, in debtor appeals, although the 
debtor succeeds more often against the USDOE than other creditors, the result 
is not statistically significant.  On the other hand, in creditor appeals, other 
creditors succeed more often than the USDOE (57.3% compared to 14.29%), 
and the difference is statistically significant.  Thus, when the USDOE appeals, 
the debtor is likely to fare better than when another creditor appeals.  As noted 
in Figure 9, the USDOE was the appellant in only seven cases during the ten-
year period covered in this study.  If this small number is indicative of the 
general role of the USDOE in student-loan discharge cases, it would seem that, 
with less experience, the USDOE would be likely to fare worse in litigation 
when compared to private entities. Put another way, the USDOE’s poor 
performance when it appeals might be the product of an inferior ability to 
assess appellate opportunities relative to other creditors who may be more 
familiar with the system or have other driving incentives.176 Of course, this 
sample of seven cases is relatively small and begs the question of whether the 
statistically significant relationship has substantive significance. While this 
question is beyond the scope of this Comment, this area would appear to be 
fertile ground for future research.    
 
 176 For example, consider that a major subset of the eighty-two creditor appeals in the “Other Creditor” 
row in Figure 9 involved ECMC.  See supra Figure 9. More specifically, ECMC was involved in sixty-five of 
the eighty-nine creditor appeals, and ECMC prevailed in approximately 57% of those appeals.  See supra 
Figure 7.  Thus, the statistically significant result in Figure 9—that is, that other creditors fare better than the 
USDOE in creditor appeals—possibly suggests that repeat players are more likely to succeed than non-repeat 
players. 
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6. District Court v. BAP 
Finally, the last major focus of the study is to compare the success rates of 
student-loan debtors in the District Courts and BAPs. Based on the conclusions 
of the Nash/Pardo study,177 I hypothesized that because the BAPs are courts 
that deal specifically with bankruptcy cases178 and District Courts only deal 
sporadically with bankruptcy cases,179 debtors will more likely be on a level 
playing field in BAPs. Two reasons suggest this outcome. First, judges on the 
BAPs have repeated exposure to the common players, like ECMC, in student-
loan debt discharge proceedings. This familiarity allows these judges to be 
more sensitive to ECMC’s and others’ litigation techniques. Essentially, their 
familiarity with common creditor tactics helps them to more effectively hear 
the case without being swayed by extra-legal factors. Second, because judges 
on BAPs are bankruptcy court judges themselves, they have greater experience 
applying the undue hardship provision firsthand. Therefore, because the 
playing field is more level in the BAP, the likely result is that BAPs will 
produce results more favorable to the debtor than the results observed in the 
overall success on appeal data from Figure 1. Figures 10 and 11 show the 
different success rates of the debtor in both the District Courts and BAPs: 
Figure 10: Success on Appeal in the District Courts 
Appellant 
            Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
20 27 47 
42.55% 57.45% 100.00% 
Debtor 
21 2 23 
91.30% 8.70% 100.00% 
Total 
41 29 70 
58.57% 41.43% 100.00% 








 177 See supra Part II.B. 
 178 This experience means that bankruptcy judges are likely to have significantly more expertise in this 
area. 
 179 Bankruptcy cases only encompass a small percentage of the types of cases heard by district courts. 
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Figure 11: Success on Appeal in the BAPs 
Appellant 
           Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
12 11 23 
52.17% 47.83% 100.00% 
Debtor 
5 2 7 
71.43% 28.57% 100.00% 
Total 
17 13 30 
56.67% 43.33% 100.00% 
  Pearson chi2(1) = 0.8103 Pr = 0.368   
 These results show the district court is a place of little hope for the student-
loan debtor. This data indicates a statistically significant finding in the 
correlation between the appellant and their success on appeal with less than a 
0.0001 probability that such finding was based on random chance alone. In the 
district court, debtors’ success, whether or not they were the appellant, was 
well below the overall averages shown in Figure 1.180 Although the findings 
for debtors’ success on appeal in BAPs did not fall within the statistically 
significant range, they do show that in the cases analyzed, debtors fared much 
better in the BAP than in the district court. 
Finally, Figure 12 shows the success rate of the debtor at the court of 
appeals level: 
Figure 12: Success on Appeal in the Courts of Appeals 
Appellant 
           Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
9 10 19 
47.37% 52.63% 100.00% 
Debtor 
17 6 23 
73.91% 26.09% 100.00% 
Total 
26 16 42 
61.90% 38.10% 100.00% 
  Pearson chi2(1) = 3.1088 Pr = 0.078   
Although the results of this analysis approached statistical significance (p = 
0.078), it is interesting to note that in both the courts of appeals and the BAPs 
 
 180 As debtor-appellee, compare 42.55% in the district court to 46.07% in the overall findings from Figure 
1. As debtor-appellant, compare 8.70% in the district court to 18.87% in the overall findings from Figure 1. 
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the debtor fared considerably better than in the district court. Assuming that 
results more favorable to the student-loan debtor than the unbalanced results 
from Figure 1 are theoretically more in line with the Code’s intent, this 
analysis bolsters the claim of the Nash/Pardo study that appellate panel courts 
like the court of appeals and the BAP provide a higher level of quality 
appellate review.181 
Looking to further compare the results of this study to the findings from the 
Nash/Pardo study of appellate review, Figure 13 illustrates the success rates of 
debtors on appeal to circuit courts. Here, success for the debtor is defined as 
either a case where the debtor appealed and the lower court’s decision was 
overturned or when a creditor appealed and the lower court’s decision was 
either fully or partly affirmed. Figure 13 is a compilation of findings from 
forty-two observed cases in the different courts of appeals, thirty of which 
were appealed from the district courts and twelve of which were appealed from 
BAPs: 
Figure 13: Success Rate for Debtors in Circuit Courts 
  Court of Appeals 
Creditor Appeals from BAPs 37.50% 
Debtor Appeals from BAPs 25.00% 
Total Appeals from BAPs 33.33% 
Overall BAP Affirmance  50.00% 
Creditor Appeals from DCs 54.55% 
Debtor Appeals from DCs 26.32% 
Total Appeals from DCs 36.67% 
Overall DC Affirmance  66.67% 
Overall Affirmance 61.90% 
This table shows that the courts of appeals affirmed 61.90% of all undue 
hardship decision brought under its purview. However, the affirmance rate was 
considerably higher on decisions appealed from district courts.182 Interestingly 
though, the debtor seemed to fare better in the courts of appeals when the 
 
 181 See Nash & Pardo, supra note 94, at 1747. 
 182 Compare 66.67% affirmance rate in appeals from district courts to 50% affirmance rate in appeals 
from BAPs. 
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appeal originated from a district court. These figures, though they do not 
directly bolster the results of the Nash/Pardo study, possibly indicate support 
for the value of panel review. Assuming once more that decisions which favor 
the student-loan debtor more than the unbalanced results from Figure 1 are 
theoretically more in line with what the Code intended, then higher success 
rates for debtors in appeals from district courts are evidence of the circuit 
courts leveling out the playing field, or at least bringing the results of the 
district court, where debtors fared poorly,183 more on par with the results from 
the BAPs.184 
CONCLUSION 
The observations presented here evidence a trend in appellate courts of 
applying a progressively harsher standard of review in undue hardship 
determinations. Increasingly limited by precedent, courts applying the two tests 
find they have little choice but to find student-loan debts nondischargeable. 
The findings in this Comment show that many of the characteristics presumed 
to forecast success have little impact as to the debtor’s success on appeal. The 
presence of a medical condition, though, appears to still be a differentiating 
factor, often allowing the debtor a more equitable opportunity to win his case. 
It still seems, though, that the appellate courts have chosen to take a consistent, 
but harsh approach to interpreting whether or not a debtor has satisfied the 
undue hardship test. 
For practitioners, this finding means taking a careful look to see whether it 
is wise to move forward on an appeal, or if appeal is made, whether it might be 
wise to take a settlement offer. Furthermore, this study may indicate that if an 
appeal is chosen, then it might be wise for a debtor to go to a BAP, if 
possible.185 For courts, this study calls for some reflection on why such a harsh 
standard is being applied at the appellate level. Though student loans are 
unique in their difficulty to discharge, one court, at least, has noted: 
Despite Congress’ proven willingness to amend § 523(a)(8) to further 
restrict the dischargeability of student loan debt, and in spite of the 
availability of the ICRP option for repayment of student loans, 
 
 183 See supra Figure 10. 
 184 See supra Figure 11. This assertion is reinforced by the fact that the results in Figures 11 and 12 are 
substantially the same. 
 185 Note that there is still an opt out choice for either party to choose to go to a district court instead of a 
BAP. 11 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) (2012). 
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Congress chose to continue the undue hardship exception to 
nondischargeability. Indeed, provisions in the House and Senate bills 
designed to make student loans conclusively nondischargeable were 
stripped from the bills in favor of maintaining § 523(a)(8)’s undue 
hardship exception to nondischargeability of student loan debt.186 
The continued presence of the availability of discharge for student-loan debtors 
suggests that courts should take a second look at their approach to undue 
hardship determinations to see if they are really conforming to the Code’s 
intent. If Congress has not been willing to do away with the option of 
dischargeability for student-loan debt, then perhaps the lopsided results from 
this study indicate a system in need of reexamination, and, ultimately, a more 




 186 Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Jesperson, 571 F.3d 775, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 
Debtor-Appellant Income Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part 
Affirm 
 Percentiles Smallest     
1% 124.17 124.17     
5% 124.17 847.36     
10% 846.36 1000 Obs 15 
25% 1120 1120 Sum of Wgt. 15 
        
50% 1680.47  Mean 2064.193 
   Largest Std. Dev. 1137.134 
75% 3300 3300     
90% 3642.48 3419 Variance 1293074 
95% 3666.67 3642.48 Skewness 0.13167 
99% 3666.67 3666.67 Kurtosis 1.79294 
Table A2 
Debtor-Appellant Income Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full 
Reversal 
 Percentiles Smallest     
1% 891 891     
5% 891 1063.21     
10% 891 1401 Obs 8 
25% 1232.105 1459 Sum of Wgt. 8 
        
50% 1529.5  Mean 1586.589 
   Largest Std. Dev. 517.1514 
75% 1974.665 1600     
90% 2329.17 1650 Variance 267445.6 
95% 2329.17 2299.33 Skewness 0.31294 
99% 2329.17 2329.17 Kurtosis 1.99209 
The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the 
debtor’s income based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the 
debtor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==1). Thus, for cases where the debtor 
was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment below, 
the median income was $1,680.47 and the mean income $2,064.19. For 
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cases where the debtor was the appellant and the court fully reversed the 
judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the debtor), the median income was 
$1,529.50 and the mean income was $1,586.59. 
Table A3 
Creditor-Appellant Income Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part 
Affirm 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 405 405     
5% 868 868     
10% 946 946 Obs 26 
25% 1132 991 Sum of Wgt. 26 
        
50% 1827.5  Mean 2194.355 
   Largest Std. Dev. 1402.654 
75% 3300 3842.04     
90% 4355.48 4355.48 Variance 1967439 
95% 5264.58 5264.58 Skewness 0.968103 
99% 5500 5500 Kurtosis 2.926138 
Table A4 
Creditor-Appellant Income Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full 
Reversal 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 700 700     
5% 760 760     
10% 946 918 Obs 33 
25% 1143 946 Sum of Wgt. 33 
        
50% 2030.72  Mean 2087.118 
   Largest Std. Dev. 853.8859 
75% 2524 3208     
90% 3208 3300 Variance 729121.1 
95% 3574.56 3574.56 Skewness 0.292728 
99% 4033.33 4033.33 Kurtosis 2.389843 
The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the 
debtor’s monthly income based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases 
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where the creditor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==0). Thus, for cases 
where the creditor was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the 
judgment below, the median income was $1,827.50 and the mean income 
$2,194.36. For cases where the creditor was the appellant and the court fully 
reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the creditor), the median 
income was $2,030.72 and the mean income was $2,087.12. 
Table A5 
Logistic Regression Model for Effect of Income on Appellate Decision 
      Number of Obs = 82   
    LR chi2 (1) = 0.44   
    Prob > chi2 = 0.507   
Log Likelihood = -56.618   Pseudo R2 = 0.0039   
appoutcome Coef. Std. Err. Z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Income -0.0001 0.00021 -0.66 0.509 -0.0005 0.00027 
_cons 0.283 0.48182 0.59 0.557 -0.6613 1.22736 
The table above indicates that the debtor’s income (income) is not a 
statistically significant predictor of the outcome on appeal (appoutcome),         
z = -0.66, p = 0.509. The table results are from a logistic regression, with the 
appeal outcome (appoutcome) as the dependent variable and the income of the 
debtor (income) as the independent (i.e., predictor) variable. 
Table A6 
Debtor-Appellant Expenses Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part 
Affirm 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 492 492     
5% 492 1100     
10% 1100 1300 Obs                        13 
25% 1619.27 1619.27 Sum of Wgt.          13 
       
50% 1829.39  Mean 2024.025 
   Largest Std. Dev. 859.4745 
75% 2600 2600     
90% 3387 2771 Variance 738696.3 
95% 3416.67 3387 Skewness 0.138138 
99% 3416.67 3416.67 Kurtosis 2.348373 
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Table A7 
Debtor-Appellant Expenses Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full 
Reversal 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 1074 1074     
5% 1074 1161     
10% 1074 1575 Obs 6 
25% 1161 1785 
Sum of 
Wgt. 6 
        
50% 1680  Mean 1686.537 
   Largest Std. Dev. 517.3519 
75% 2229.17 1575     
90% 2229.05 1785 Variance 267653 
95% 2229.05 2229.17 Skewness 0.015347 
99% 2229.05 2229.05 Kurtosis 1.477827 
The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the 
debtor’s expenses based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the 
debtor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==1). Thus, for cases where the debtor 
was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment below, 
the median debtor had monthly expenses of $1,829.39 and the mean debtor had 
monthly expenses of $2,024.03. For cases where the debtor was the appellant 
and the court fully reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the 
debtor), the median debtor had monthly expenses of $1,680 and the mean 
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Table A8 
Creditor-Appellant Expenses Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was 
Full/Part Affirm 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 830 830     
5% 948 948     
10% 1172 1172 Obs 21 
25% 1404 1234 
Sum of 
Wgt. 21 
        
50% 2111  Mean 2675.894 
   Largest Std. Dev. 1591.528 
75% 3575 4327.47     
90% 5171 5171 Variance 2532962 
95% 5913 5913 Skewness 0.832385 
99% 5913 5913 Kurtosis 2.526385 
 
Table A9 
Creditor-Appellant Expenses Distribution When Appeal Outcome Was Full 
Reversal 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 750 750     
5% 830 830     
10% 1022 1018.66 Obs 34 
25% 1686.31 1022 Sum of Wgt. 34 
        
50% 2328  Mean 2217.661 
   Largest Std. Dev. 804.9414 
75% 2619 3259     
90% 3259 3626 Variance 647930.6 
95% 3657 3657 Skewness 0.1090852 
99% 3942 3942 Kurtosis 2.531794 
The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the 
debtor’s expenses based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the 
creditor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==0). Thus, for cases where the 
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creditor was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment 
below, the median debtor had expenses of $2,111 and the mean debtor had 
monthly expenses of $2,675.89 For cases where the creditor was the appellant 
and the court fully reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the 
creditor), the median debtor had expenses of $2,328 and the mean debtor had 
expenses of $2,217.66. 
Table A10 
Logistic Regression Model for Effect of Expenses on Appellate Decision 
 
        
Number of Obs = 
74 
  
    LR chi2 (1) = 1.29   
    Prob > chi2 = 0.2568   
Log Likelihood = -50.406495 Pseudo R2 = 0.0126   
  Coef. Std. Err. z         P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Expenses -0.0002448 0.0002195 -1.11 0.265 -0.0006751 0.0001855 
_cons 0.719345 0.5514051 1.3 0.192 -0.3613891 1.800079 
The table results are from a logistic regression, with the appeal outcome 
(appoutcome) as the dependent variable and the expenses of the debtor 
(expenses) as the independent (i.e., predictor) variable. The table above 
indicates that the amount of the debtor’s expenses (expenses) is not a 
statistically significant predictor of the outcome on appeal (appoutcome),         
z = -1.11, p = 0.265. 
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Table A11 
Debtor-Appellant Average Debt When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part Affirm 
 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 3000 3000     
5% 11183.4 11183.4     
10% 21865.3 16312.34 Obs 37 
25% 44500 21865.3 
Sum of 
Wgt. 37 
        
50% 68945.3  Mean 79759.5 
   Largest Std. Dev. 56498.73 
75% 100000 142000     
90% 142000 161000 Variance 3.19E+09 
95% 181743.4 181743.4 Skewness 1.714819 
99% 297953 297953 Kurtosis 7.217371 
Table A12 
Debtor-Appellant Average Debt When Appeal Outcome Was Full Reversal 
 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 27781 27781     
5% 27781 45000     
10% 27781 70000 Obs 8 
25% 57500 73000 
Sum of 
Wgt. 8 
        
50% 77287.5  Mean 108708.5 
   Largest Std. Dev. 105596.8 
75% 106283.5 81575     
90% 359745 85000 Variance 1.12E+10 
95% 359745 127567 Skewness 1.932742 
99% 359745 359745 Kurtosis 5.29914 
The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the 
debtor’s debt based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the 
debtor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==1). Thus, for cases where the debtor 
was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment below, 
the median debtor had average debt of $68,945.30 and the mean debtor had 
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average debt of $79,759.50. For cases where the debtor was the appellant and 
the court fully reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the 
debtor), the median debtor had average debt of $77,287.50 and the mean 
debtor had average debt of $108,708.50. 
Table A13 
Creditor-Appellant Average Debt When Appeal Outcome Was Full/Part 
Affirm 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 15662 15662     
5% 16215.08 16215.08     
10% 20000 18500 Obs 37 
25% 38978.2 20000 
Sum of 
Wgt. 37 
        
50% 63109.87  Mean 86133.69 
   Largest Std. Dev. 75888.02 
75% 100000 240000     
90% 240000 283354.5 Variance 5.76E+09 
95% 283354.5 283354.5 Skewness 1.733684 
99% 304463.6 304463.6 Kurtosis 5.205519 
Table A14 
Creditor-Appellant Average Debt When Appeal Outcome Was Full Reversal 
  Percentiles Smallest     
1% 7038.21 7038.21     
5% 11715.25 11293.68     
10% 18263.4 11715.25 Obs 45 
25% 33000 12148.7 
Sum of 
Wgt. 45 
        
50% 61800  Mean 75266.94 
   Largest Std. Dev. 61293.43 
75% 89832.16 16000     
90% 150782.9 217920 Variance 3.76E+09 
95% 217920 235000 Skewness 1.803723 
99% 304463.6 304463.6 Kurtosis 6.671375 
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The two tables above set forth summary statistics for the distribution of the 
debtor’s debt based on the outcome of the appeal for those cases where the 
creditor was the appellant (i.e., debtorapp==0). Thus, for cases where the 
creditor was the appellant and the court fully or partly affirmed the judgment 
below, the median debtor had average debt of $63,109.87 and the mean debtor 
had average debt of $86,133.69. For cases where the creditor was the appellant 
and the court fully reversed the judgment below (i.e., a complete win for the 
creditor), the median debtor had average debt of $61,000 and the mean debtor 
had average debt of $75,266.94. 
Table A15 
Logistic Regression Model for Effect of Average Debt on Appellate Decision 
 
      
  
Number of Obs = 127   
    LR chi2 (1) = 0.05   
    Prob > chi2 = 0.8274   
Log Likelihood = -86.261702 Pseudo R2 = 0.0003   
  Coef. Std. Err. z        P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
Debt -5.86E-07 2.70E-06 -0.22 0.828 -5.87E-06 4.70E-06 
_cons -2.859136 0.2838156 -1.01 0.314 -0.8421819 0.2703548 
The table results are from a logistic regression, with the appeal outcome 
(appoutcome) as the dependent variable and the amount of debt (debt) as the 
independent (i.e., predictor) variable. The amount of debt is not a statistically 
significant predictor of the outcome on appeal, z = -0.22, p = 0.828. 
Table A16 
Success on Appeal, 1st Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
3 6 9 
33.33% 66.67% 100.00% 
Debtor 
3 0 3 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total 
6 6 12 
50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 
  Fisher’s exact = 0.182                 1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.091 
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Table A17 
Success On Appeal, 2nd Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes   
Creditor 
1 1 2 
50.00% 50.00% 100.00% 
Debtor 
4 0 4 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total 
5 1 6 
83.33% 16.67% 100.00% 







Success on Appeal, 3rd Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
2 0 2 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Debtor 
3 1 4 
75.00% 25.00% 100.00% 
Total 
5 1 6 
83.33% 16.67% 100.00% 
  Fisher’s exact = 1.000                 1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.667 
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Table A19 
Success on Appeal, 4th Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
3 10 13 
23.08% 76.92% 100.00% 
Debtor 
5 4 9 
55.56% 44.44% 100.00% 
Total 
8 14 22 
36.36% 63.64% 100.00% 







Success on Appeal, 5th Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
1 3 4 
25.00% 75.00% 100.00% 
Debtor 
3 0 3 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total 
4 3 7 
57.14% 42.86% 100.00% 








FREEMAN GALLEYSPROOFS 2/25/2014 9:16 AM 
2013] STUDENT-LOAN DISCHARGE 203 
Table A21 
Success on Appeal, 6th Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
8 5 13 
61.54% 38.46% 100.00% 
Debtor 
3 0 3 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total 
11 5 16 
68.75% 31.25% 100.00% 







Success on Appeal, 7th Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
2 4 6 
33.33% 66.67% 100.00% 
Debtor 
4 1 5 
80.00% 20.00% 100.00% 
Total 
6 5 11 
54.55% 45.45% 100.00% 
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Table A23 
Success on Appeal, 8th Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes  
Creditor 
10 4 14 
71.43% 28.57% 100.00% 
Debtor 
3 0 3 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total 
13 4 17 
76.47% 23.53% 100.00% 







Success on Appeal, 9th Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes   
Creditor 
5 8 13 
38.46% 61.54% 100.00% 
Debtor 
11 4 15 
73.33% 26.67% 100.00% 
Total 
16 12 28 
57.14% 42.86% 100.00% 
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Table A25 
Success on Appeal, 10th Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes   
Creditor 
4 2 6 
66.67% 33.33% 100.00% 
Debtor 
3 0 3 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total 
7 2 9 
77.78% 22.22% 100.00% 








Success on Appeal, 11th Circuit 
Appellant 
Success on Appeal Total 
No Yes   
Creditor 
2 5 7 
28.57% 71.43% 100.00% 
Debtor 
1 0 1 
100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Total 
3 5 8 
37.50% 62.50% 100.00% 
  Fisher’s exact = 0.375                 1-sided Fisher’s exact = 0.375 
 
